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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I explore ethno-national resistance to reform efforts aimed at strengthening 
the national government and reintegrating the system of education in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
discussion stems from ethnographic fieldwork conducted during the summer of 2015, in 
response to an October 2014 Supreme Court ruling in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
found the “two schools under one roof” program unconstitutional, and ordered an end to its 
practice. Fieldwork was conducted primarily in one town in the Central Bosnia Canton, and my 
goal was to see whether there had been any proposed changes to local schools in response to the 
2014 Supreme Court ruling, and if there had not, what local attitudes regarding such a ruling 
were, along with attitudes about the “two schools under one roof” program, and education in BiH 
in general. I draw upon discussions concerned with post-conflict reconciliation, ethnic identity, 
and language ideology to explore the tensions that exist between state-level mandates aimed at 
reintegration, and the preferences of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ruling elites. I demonstrate that the 
power-sharing mechanisms established in the Dayton Peace Accords have enabled ethno-
national leaders to resist reforms aimed at a centralized state, which has allowed the “two schools 
under one roof” program to continue. In doing so, I argue that ethno-national resistance to reform 
and reintegration efforts further encourages spatial divisions, and allows schools to become 
private spaces that are used for the reproduction of ethno-national identities rather than as forums 
for cohesion and the interaction of a common citizenry. 
  
    
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis, I explore ethno-national resistance to reform efforts aimed at strengthening 
the national government in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and reintegrating the ethnically-divided 
system of education, and in particular, the “two schools under one roof” program in the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH). This discussion stems from ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted during the summer of 2015, in response to an October 2014, Supreme Court ruling in 
the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that said “organising school systems based on ethnic 
background and implementing curriculums on ethnic principles, which divide children was 
discriminatory.”1 The court ruling ordered schools to implement “common integrated 
multicultural education facilities.”2  
Fieldwork was conducted primarily in one town in the Central Bosnia Canton, and my 
goal was to see whether there had been any proposed changes to local schools in response to the 
2014 Supreme Court ruling, and if there had not, what local attitudes regarding such a ruling 
were, along with attitudes about the “two schools under one roof” program, and education in BiH 
in general. I chose the Central Bosnia Canton as the site of my research largely because it is 
officially an “ethnically mixed” canton (Bosniaks and Croats) and the “two schools in one roof” 
program is in effect in this area. 
Although I was able to learn shortly after my arrival to the Central Bosnia Canton that no 
changes to the local schools had been proposed by the Ministry of Education in response to the 
2014 Supreme Court ruling, I still found it worthwhile to engage in discussions with participants 
                                                
1	Dzidic,	D.	(2014).	Bosnia	Federation	Rules	Against	Ethnically-Divided	Schools.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-federation-court-rules-against-school-discrimination		
2	ibid.	
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due to the government’s renewed commitments to work towards European integration. As part of 
this commitment, BiH’s leaders have pledged to ensure that “access to all levels of education and 
training is free of any discrimination on the grounds of gender, color, ethnic origin or religion.”3  
In the chapters that follow, I draw upon discussions concerned with post-conflict 
reconciliation, ethnic identity, and language ideology to explore the tensions that exist between 
state-level mandates aimed at reintegration, and the preferences of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ethno-
national leaders. I demonstrate that the power-sharing mechanisms established in the Dayton 
Peace Accords have enabled ethno-national leaders to resist reforms aimed at a centralized state, 
which has allowed ethnically-divided education and the “two schools under one roof” program to 
continue. In doing so, I argue that ethno-national resistance to reform and reintegration efforts 
further encourages spatial divisions, and allows schools to become private spaces that are used 
for the reproduction of ethno-national identities rather than as forums for cohesion and the 
interaction of a common citizenry. 
 
Background 
Ethnically-divided education exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian war of independence. Divisions in education began in 
1992, and further developed over the next three years, as the country was territorially and 
politically divided between Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats.4 In the area of this study, the Central 
Bosnia Canton, fighting between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats (Bosnian Catholics) 
took place until late February 1994, at which point a cease-fire was adopted and the Washington 
                                                
3	Schroeder,	H.	(2012).	10	Years	of	BiH	membership	in	the	Council	of	Europe:	Ending	Segregation	and	Discrimination	in	
Education	in	Law	and	in	Practice.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	http://europa.ba/?p=19244		
4	Kreso,	Adila	Pašalić.	(2008).	The	War	and	Post-War	Impact	on	the	Educational	System	of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	International	
Review	of	Education,	54,	353-374.	Pg.	353-54.	
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Agreement was signed.5 The Washington Agreement established the Federation of BiH, which 
consists of ten independent cantons, and re-allied the Bosniak and Croat forces to defend the 
territory against the Serbs. It also left in place a decentralized system of education, which led to 
the creation of independent ministries at the cantonal level. This has resulted in mono-ethnic 
schools in ethnically homogenous areas, and the “two schools under one roof” program in areas 
with mixed populations.  
The Dayton Peace Accords, signed by the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, as well 
as representatives of Bosnian Croats and Serbs, on November 21, 1995, brought an end to the 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and established the post-war constitution for the republic. The 
Dayton Peace Accords retained Bosnia-Herzegovina’s international borders, but divided the 
country into two autonomous entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated 
Republika Srpska.6 The agreement granted control of fifty-one percent of the territory to the 
FBiH and forty-nine percent to the Republika Srpska. It also created an independent “District of 
Brčko” in the northeast corner of the country.  
The purpose of the Dayton Peace Accords was to bring an end to the violence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which proved effective, but because the International Community in BiH (the 
United States, the EU, and Russia) worked to establish peace with the same leaders who led the 
country into war, what was established was the partitioning of the country along ethno-national 
lines. Although the agreement brought an end to the military violence, it also resulted in ethnicity 
being the main factor in Bosnian political identity.7 This has resulted in what has been referred to 
                                                
5	Shrader,	C.	(2003).	Muslim-Croat	Civil	War	in	Bosnia:	A	Military	History,	1992-1994	(Eastern	European	studies	(College	Station,	
Tex.)	no.	23).	College	Station:	Texas	A	&	M	University	Press,	160.	
6	Although	the	territories	are	independent	entities,	their	borders	are	non-sovereign.	One	reform	that	was	passed	in	the	early	
2000s	states	that	citizens	of	either	entity	now	have	full	rights	throughout	the	country.	"The	Constituent	Peoples'	Decision	in	
Bosnia-Herzegovina,"	International	Crisis	Report,	No.	128,	16	April	2002.	
7	Gagnon,	V.	(2004).	Myth	of	Ethnic	War	Serbia	and	Croatia	in	the	1990s.	Cornell	University	Press.	
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as an “ethnopolis,” a system of governance where politicians, if they want to be successful, must 
act as patrons for their ethnic constituencies, and people, if they want to survive, must navigate 
the ethnic avenues familiar to them.8 The Dayton Peace Accords also established the Office of 
the High Representative, an internationally-appointed position and the highest authority in the 
country, to oversee its implementation. The presence of the High Representative in the country 
will be discussed more in the next chapter.  
As will be detailed in chapter three, education is highly decentralized in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and there are 14 ministries of education. Conversely, in the Republika Srpska, 
education is highly centralized because of the Serb majority, but in the Federation, the 
governments of each canton are obliged to transfer control of education to municipal 
governments in areas where the majority population of a municipality differs from the majority 
population of the entire canton.9 Similar to the Republika Srpska, education is not contested in 
ethnically homogenous parts of the Federation, but in areas where control has been transferred to 
municipalities, ethnically homogenous schools are able to embrace mono-ethnic curriculums.10 
In the separate curriculums, Croats use textbooks that are developed in Croatia, Serbs use 
textbooks developed in Serbia, and Bosniaks use textbooks developed in BiH, commonly 
referred to as the Federal curriculum.  
It is reported that approximately 100,000 people were killed during the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and 2.3 million of the 4.4 million inhabitants were displaced. More than half of 
                                                
8 Mujkić,	A.	(2007).	We,	the	Citizens	of	Ethnopolis.	Constellations,	14(1),	112-128,	113. 
9 Constitution	of	the	Federation	of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	[Bosnia	and	Herzegovina],	18	March	1994,	available	at:	
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b56e4.html	[accessed	19	April	2016]	
10 Božić,	G.	(2006).	Reeducating	the	Hearts	of	Bosnian	Students:	An	Essay	on	Some	Aspects	of	Education	in	Bosnia	and	
Herzegovina.	East	European	Politics	and	Societies,	20(2),	319–342. 
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these were internally displaced persons, who remained in BiH.11 While most of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s schools became mono-ethnic as a result of the territorial divisions, the “two 
schools under one roof” program emerged in mixed areas due to a legal provision intended to 
encourage the return of displaced persons to their former homes, which was not as successful as 
envisioned.12 One of the reasons for this was that for many displaced persons, there was nothing 
to return to: no homes, jobs, or schools. For Bosniak refugees from eastern parts of the country, 
for instance, it was often the case that entire villages were forcefully evicted and destroyed. 
Similarly, much of the diaspora outside of BiH has not returned simply because there have been 
more opportunities for life abroad.13 As can be seen below, the ethnic composition of BiH shifted 
greatly during the war.14 
Figure 1. Ethnic composition of BiH until 1991 (Source: Pašalić-Kreso 2008: 358). 
 
                                                
11	Cutts,	Mark.	(1999).	The	Humanitarian	Operation	in	Bosnia,	1992-95:	Dilemmas	of	Negotiating	Humanitarian	Access.	Geneva:	
Centre	for	Documentation	and	Research,	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees,	1-26,	1.	
12	Annex	7	in	the	Dayton	Peace	Accords	grants	rights	of	personhood,	including	the	right	to	be	educated	in	one’s	national	
language	or	mother	tongue.	This	led	to	institutionalized	divisions	in	education.		
13	Halilovich,	H.	(2013).	Places	of	pain:	Forced	displacement,	popular	memory,	and	trans-local	identities	in	Bosnian	war-torn	
communities.	New	York:	Berghahn	Books.	
14	Kreso,	Adila	Pašalić.	(2008).	ibid.,	358.	
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Figure 2. Ethnic composition of BiH after 1998 (Source: Pašalić-Kreso 2008: 358). 
Rather than returning, people have continued to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
classrooms have been going empty, according to recent figures.15 The preliminary results of the 
first post-war census, carried out in October, 2013, report that the population of BiH is 
3,867,055, with an ethnic composition of: Bosniaks 48.4%, Serbs 32.7%, Croats 14.6%, and 
Others 4.3%.16 In addition, current estimates indicate unemployment is slightly more than 
twenty-five percent, while youth unemployment is more than sixty percent.17 Bosnia-
Herzegovina is in a deficit and close to bankruptcy.18 Although unpopular, state-level mandates 
aimed at a centralized government and unified system of education offer the potential for 
reduced public sector spending as well as European standardization.  
                                                
15	Zelenika,	P.	(2016,	January	28).	“U	osnovnim	školama	u	FBiH	za	pet	godina	700	učionica	ostalo	prazno.”	Retrieved	February	
02,	2016,	from	http://www.vecernji.ba/u-osnovnim-skolama-u-fbih-za-pet-godina-700-ucionica-ostalo-prazno-1055480	-This	
article	reports	that	the	number	of	students	enrolled	in	primary	education	in	the	FBiH	over	the	past	five	years	(2011/12-
2015/16)	has	dropped	by	19,705	or	9.45%,	resulting	in	approximately	700	empty	classrooms.	Figures	are	from	the	Federal	
Ministry	of	Education	in	the	FBiH.		
16	The	World	FactBook:	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	(2016,	March	17).	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html		
17	EC:	Commission	Staff	Working	Document,	BiH.	2015	Report.	Brussels,	10.11.2015.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf,	69.	
18	Simic,	D.	(2016,	January	25).	“Bankrupt	Bosnia	Looks	to	IMF	for	Salvation.”	Retrieved	February	02,	2016,	from	
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bankrupt-bosnia-looks-to-imf-for-salvation-01-25-2016.		
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Literature  
Review 
 
In the following section, I draw upon discussions that deal with post-conflict 
reconciliation in areas where ethno-nationalism has played a role, as well as studies on language 
ideology and ethnic identity, intended to provide readers with a framework for contextualizing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. After I read about the October 2014 Supreme Court ruling, an examination 
of the closely-related literature helped me to parse out the various desires of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s ethno-national leaders, and to find common grounds between the legally separate 
peoples, which ultimately guided my study. In addition, due to my education in Political Science 
and Journalism, as well as Anthropology, this review draws on discussions from multiple 
disciplines.  
Currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are three formally recognized constitutive nations 
or constituent peoples.19 As mentioned, they are Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, and as will be 
explained more throughout this discussion, the majority of each also strongly identifies along 
religious lines. For the most part, Serbs are Orthodox, while Croats are Catholic. The term 
Bosniak refers specifically to Bosnian Muslims, whereas the term Bosnian can refer to any 
citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it is important to mention that in post-war BiH, most 
Croats and Serbs reject the term Bosnian and instead declare themselves Croatian and Serbian. In 
the past, the terms Bosnian and Bosniak were used synonymously, but the meanings of the two 
have diverged.20 Now, Bosnian is also used by people with mixed backgrounds, members of 
minority groups, and those who reject an ethno-national identification. 
                                                
19	This	means	that	they	share	power	equally,	regardless	of	population	proportion.	
20	Bringa,	T.	(1995).	Being	Muslim	the	Bosnian	way:	Identity	and	community	in	a	central	Bosnian	village	/	Tone	Bringa.	
(Princeton	studies	in	Muslim	politics).	Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	34.		
8 
 
Prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the official language of the socialist-republic was 
Serbo-Croatian or Croat-Serbian.21 Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was acceptable to say that the 
language was Bosnian, but it was also understood that the language was only regionally different 
from the other two. As a result of the war, today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are three official 
languages: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian.22 As will be discussed more in chapter three, this has 
also been an area of nationalist contention, having to do with deeper claims to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and surrounding questions concerning the legitimacy of the Bosnian state. Based 
on linguistic studies, it can be said that Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are one language that has 
standard variants.23 This is comparable to the case of American English and its accents across the 
United States.24 Ultimately, the variants “can be taught together in a single classroom.”25  
Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, scholars have reflected not only on the 
international response to the violence in BiH and the post-Dayton process, but also on academic 
and media coverage of the conflict as it took place. In particular, Gagnon notes that many were 
quick to portray the reasons for the inter-ethnic violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina as either 
primordialist or essentialist.26 Some explanations supposed that the various groups in the Balkans 
had been in conflict ever since their settlement in the region, and that the most recent violence 
was just a resurgence of those “ancient ethnic hatreds.”27 This is problematic because it leads 
                                                
21 Hromadzic,	A.	(2015).	Citizens	of	an	empty	nation:	Youth	and	state-making	in	postwar	Bosnia-Herzegovina.	Philadelphia,	PA:	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	46-47.	
22	Although	Bosnia-Herzegovina’s	state-level	constitution	does	not	list	an	official	language,	the	entity	and	cantonal	constitutions	
recognize	Bosnian,	Croatian,	&	Serbian	as	separate	languages.	
23	Kordić,	S.	(2010).	Jezik	i	Nacionalizam.	Zagreb:	Durieux.	Retrieved	19	April	2016	from	
https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/475567.Jezik_i_nacionalizam.pdf,	77.	
24	Wilson,	T.,	Milano,	S.,	Myers,	L.,	Marini,	L.,	Davis,	G.,	Kolker,	Andrew,	.	.	.	CNAM	Film	Library.	(1987).	American	tongues	/	the	
Center	for	New	American	Media	presents;	a	videotape	by	Andrew	Kolker	and	Louis	Alvarez.	(No	dot	version].	ed.).	New	York:	
Harriman,	N.Y.:	Center	for	New	American	Media;	Distributed	in	the	USA	by	CNAM	Film	Library.	
25	Alexander,	Elias-Bursać,	Douglass	K.	Daniel,	&	Ronelle	Alexander	--	Ellen	Elias-Bursać.	(2010).	Bosnian,	Croatian,	Serbian,	a	
Textbook:	With	Exercises	and	Basic	Grammar.	University	of	Wisconsin	Press,	xi.		
26	Gagnon,	V.	(2004).	ibid.,	xviii.	
27	Robert	D.	Kaplan’s	(1993)	book	Balkan	Ghosts,	has	repeatedly	been	mentioned	as	an	example	that	argues	the	ancient	ethnic	
hatreds	thesis.	Gagnon	(2004)	notes	that	the	book	was	widely	read	at	the	time	of	its	release,	and	potentially	influential	to	
policymakers.		
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people to think that the groups are incapable of coexisting, and that any successes are to be 
disregarded. It also leads to an assumption that the groups’ identities have not changed over time. 
Others linked the violence of the Bosnian war to the fall of socialism in the region, and stated 
that it was an ethnic war for national autonomy. This too is problematic because it assumes that 
ethnic conflict is a constant, and also produces correlations to earlier periods of violence in the 
region that are not necessarily factual. Furthermore, by describing the violence as an “ethnic 
conflict,” it appears distant and unrelated to Western events. 
Gagnon counters that these assumptions fail to acknowledge that the violence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was in reality directed by ethno-national leaders and carried out by their forces as a 
strategy to suppress opposition parties and civilian populations: to effectively demobilize them. 
He explains that violence was used to instill fear and silence, and to reorganize the population 
into politically homogenous bases of support. Using a social constructivist approach, which 
considers social identity as “a process of identification rather than as a static attribute,”28 he 
posits that violent strategies were used by the ethno-national leaders to suppress opposition 
“exactly because” they were unable to rally popular support with ethno-national appeals.29 By 
analyzing available polling data leading up to and during the Yugoslav dissolution, Gagnon 
demonstrates that the population in the former Yugoslavia was more concerned with 
unemployment and the economy, rather than ethno-nationalism.  
Gagnon’s argument was later supported by the well known Slovenian, Slavoj Žižek, in 
the following quote: “Serbian aggression against Bosnia in 1992 did not spring out of a conflict 
between ethnic groups. It was purely and simply the attack of Serb-dominated pre-war 
                                                
28	Gagnon,	V.	(2004).	ibid.,	8.	
29	ibid.		
10 
 
Yugoslavia against Tito's post-war Yugoslavia.”30 Amidst the violence and displacement, ethno-
national leaders preached assurance and cooperation while they secured control of resources and 
enterprises from the former socialist republic. By the use of the described strategy, ethno-
nationalists appeared the most organized and capable, and the International Community worked 
with them to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Katherine Verdery, one of the earliest American anthropologists to conduct ethnographic 
research in Eastern Europe after the fall of socialism, writes, “The end of socialism meant the 
importing of democracy, but it entered a context that was peculiar in several ways.”31 Verdery 
explains that the various nations in the eastern bloc were engaged in restoring older forms of 
identity from “supposedly democratic precommunist pasts,” and this “created discriminations 
between people based on ethnonational differences.”32 Discriminations arose as nations struggled 
to figure out voting and property rights, but also because citizens were determined by 
ethnonational identity. Verdery concludes, “The sovereign thus [became] the ethnic collectivity; 
democracy [became] ethnocracy.”33 This research makes clear that discussions about citizenship 
in the former socialist world were intertwined with debates about national and cultural identity, 
and Verdery emphasizes that problems can arise when discussions are dealing with minority 
populations or non-citizens’ rights.  
This analysis of citizenship is supported by Susan Gal’s comparison of Eastern European 
and Western ideologies concerning public/private distinctions.34 Gal writes that in the West, the 
distinction between public/private is primarily determined by the space being occupied whereas 
                                                
30	Žižek,	S.	(1999).	NATO,	the	Left	Hand	of	God.	Retrieved	January	17,	2016	from	http://www.lacan.com/zizek-nato.htm		
31	Verdery,	K.	(1996).	What	Was	Socialism,	and	What	Comes	Next?	(Princeton	studies	in	culture/power/history).	Princeton,	N.J.:	
Princeton	University	Press,	297.	
32	ibid.	
33	ibid.	
34	Gal,	S.	(2005).	Language	Ideologies	Compared.	Journal	of	Linguistic	Anthropology,	15(1),	23-37. 
11 
 
in the former socialist world, public/private was primarily determined by public(the 
state)/private(the people) meaning that people, not spaces, constituted what was a public or 
private setting. She explains that in the West, the distinction between public/private has been 
foundational for political and economic theory, while in the former socialist world; the 
distinction is still being determined, and is a matter of language ideology. Gal states that it is 
useful to consider the distinction between public/private as,  
a matter of language ideology because language ideologies are never only about language. They 
posit close relations between linguistic practices and other social activities…and provide insights 
into the workings of ideologies more generally.35 
By considering these approaches, it becomes possible to see how ethnically-divided 
education in Bosnia-Herzegovina prevents the production of a united Bosnian identity. The 
“two-schools under one roof” program allows for the reproduction of ethno-national ideologies, 
and enables students to make public/private distinctions by identifying members of their own 
curriculum as private people, and members of the other curriculums as public people. The 
school, which should be a public space utilized for the purpose of educating young citizens, 
becomes a private space, and can be used to further the practice of othering. 
Janet M. Fuller supports this with the understanding that social identity is defined as the 
socially constructed membership in a social group or category.36 She states that while language 
choice is not the only means through which social identity is constructed; it is intertwined in 
other communicative practices, which enable the “performance of identity.”37 Durrani and 
Dunne write that group identity is intertwined in things such as language, religious beliefs, and 
                                                
35	Gal,	S.	ibid.,	24.		
36	Fuller,	J.	(2007).	Language	Choice	as	a	Means	of	Shaping	Identity.	Journal	of	Linguistic	Anthropology,	17(1),	105-129.		
37	Fuller,	J.	ibid.,	107.	
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the organizations and practices of institutions with which group members engage. They explain 
that “national identification is relational; it signifies loyalty and attachment to one community 
and casts others as outsiders.”38  
Graz University scholar Florian Bieber also points out that nationalist parties stand in 
conflict with the foundations of a multinational or multireligious state. Bieber writes that the 
nationalist parties in BiH “cannot and do not seek to represent the whole population,” and only 
view themselves as representatives of their ethnic constituencies.39 He reasons that the 
administrations of multi-national states such as BiH cannot represent the people as one nation-
state, and must compromise and delegate. Bieber assesses that the parties claim to protect the 
national interest, but in reality they only fragment it.  
In BiH, the decentralization of education along ethnic lines is a result of the 
fragmentation of the national interest. Although decentralization may allow for more local 
control, it does not necessarily guarantee an increase in efficiency or quality. As the work of 
Akhil Gupta indicates, bureaucracies in systems like these usually function best for those who 
have political connections, cultural capital, and financial backing.40 Gupta notes that the state in 
India is made up of multiple levels of government, in addition to numerous organizations and 
programs, and demonstrates that the government does not operate as a whole, but rather moves 
along in a fragmented fashion.  
Petričušić and Blondel maintain that as long as ethno-national elites do not encourage 
reconciliation and an increase of social capital, the rebuilding of trust between the groups will 
                                                
38	Durrani,	Naureen,	&	Dunne,	Mairead.	(2010).	Curriculum	and	National	Identity:	Exploring	the	Links	between	Religion	and	
Nation	in	Pakistan.	Journal	of	Curriculum	Studies,	42(2),	215-240,	218. 
39Bieber,	F.	(2000).	Bosnia-Herzegovina	and	Lebanon:	Historical	Lessons	of	Two	Multireligious	States.	Third	World	Quarterly,	
21(2),	269-281,	274.		
40	Gupta,	A.	(2012).	Red	tape:	Bureaucracy,	structural	violence,	and	poverty	in	India	/	Akhil	Gupta.	(A	John	Hope	Franklin	Center	
book).	Durham:	Duke	University	Press.	
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not take place.41 Furthermore, Kelly Hill asserts that education, if used improperly like in the 
case of BiH by its ethno-national elites, can become a tool for social division and political 
indoctrination.42 Hill claims that a lack of social cohesion in an environment like Bosnia’s can 
actually further social divisions and increase prejudice, but she also states that education is still 
the best means for increasing social cohesion, if implemented correctly.  
In the essay “Re-educating the Hearts of Bosnian Students,” Gordana Božić describes 
some of the challenges that teachers face when dealing with multiethnic classrooms.43 While her 
study is based in eastern Bosnia, and concerns Bosniaks and Serbs, it does serve as an example 
of students functioning in mixed classrooms. Božić describes a scenario in which Bosniak 
returnee parents are unable to pay for their children to attend mono-ethnic schools in neighboring 
Bosniak towns, so they attend the local primary school, which operates under the Republika 
Srpska program. This program teaches the Serbian written language (Cyrillic) first, and then the 
Bosnian alphabet (Latin).  
Nevertheless, Božić makes evident the necessity for reform in her account of the material 
being professed to students. For instance, the textbooks have a Serbian interpretation of history, 
and do not discuss the events of the war the way the Bosniaks know them. A couple of examples 
include the description of the diffusion of Turkish culture into the Bosnia-Herzegovina during 
the Ottoman reign, a focus on Serb victories in historic battles, allowing for claims to territory, 
and a diminished focus on the atrocities of the war.  
 
                                                
41	Cyril	Blondel,	&	Antonia	Petričušić.	(2012).	Introduction	-	Reconciliation	in	the	Western	Balkans:	New	Perspectives	and	
Proposals.	Journal	on	Ethnopolitics	and	Minority	Issues	in	Europe,	11(4),	1-6.	
42	Hill,	Kelly.	(2011).	Possibilities	for	Social	Cohesion	in	Education:	Bosnia-Herzegovina.	Peabody	Journal	of	Education,	86(2),	
155-170. 
43	Božić,	G.	(2007).	Conversations	with	Bosnian	Youth:	From	the	Youth	Relay	Race	to	the	Successor	Generation	Initiative*.	
Nationalities	Papers,	35(4),	743-772.	
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Her conclusions are paralleled in the description Halilovich provides in his ethnography 
of displaced and diaspora communities, in which he depicts abandoned and overgrowing 
villages, renamed streets and landmarks, the aftermath of ethnic cleansing– a conscious 
serbianization of former Bosniak territory.44 Halilovich notes the generation of students currently 
partaking in exchange trips across the country, but not learning the actual history of the nation. 
Hromadžić describes this as the “production of an empty state.”45  
As the work of scholars interested in this region shows, genuine reconciliation cannot 
take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina until there is a consensus regarding the events of the past, 
which cannot be achieved as long as there is a system that encourages different interpretations, 
and which ultimately allows schools to become private spaces that are used for the reproduction 
of ethno-national identities rather than as forums for cohesion and the interaction of a common 
citizenry. As will be discussed more throughout this thesis, although the government of BiH has 
made renewed commitments to work towards European integration, and although the citizens of 
BiH have voiced a united concern over the political and economic stagnancy the country faces, 
resistance to reform efforts on the part of ethno-national leaders at multiple levels of government 
continues to encourage spatial divisions. 
 
Ethno-national Desires in the Federation 
In this section, I provide a brief analysis of the ethno-national divisions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but more specifically, the divisions between Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although these divisions were most visible during and immediately after 
                                                
44	Halilovich,	H.	(2013).	Places	of	pain:	Forced	displacement,	popular	memory,	and	trans-local	identities	in	Bosnian	war-torn	
communities.	New	York:	Berghahn	Books.	 
45	Hromadžić,	A.	(2015).	Citizens	of	an	Empty	Nation:	Youth	and	State-Making	in	Postwar	Bosnia-Herzegovina.	Philadelphia,	PA:	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Press.	
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the war, they have remained on display. While Bosnia-Herzegovina’s government has made 
renewed commitments to work toward European Union membership, and while it can be said 
that there is a shared concern among the general population over the political and economic 
stagnancy, ethno-national resistance to reform and reintegration efforts has in some cases worked 
to encourage spatial divisions.  
Croats are numerically the smallest of the constitutive peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and Croat nationalism in BiH has deep ties to the fact that Bosnian Croats were not granted a 
separate entity at the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, unlike Bosnian Serbs and the 
Republika Srpska, which functions as an independent political and administrative “mini-state” 
within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croat nationalism views Croatia as the homeland and, in the 
extreme case, seeks to recreate Croatia’s historical boundaries to cover parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the International Community has 
worked to reintegrate Croats and Bosniaks within the Federation, but it has been a slow process. 
It can be said that the Croats are more reluctant to reintegrate because, being the smallest of the 
three, they fear being voted out of power, and do not want a minority status.  
In 2001, the Croat Chairman of the Presidency, Ante Jelavić, took formal steps to create a 
separate entity for Bosnian Croats and the High Representative to BiH at the time, Wolfgang 
Petrisch removed him from office.46 This caused great upset among Bosnian Croats, but they 
have not taken legal steps to create a third entity since then. The idea of a third entity was 
reintroduced in 2006 by then Bosnian Croat leader Ivo Miro Jović, but no measures were taken 
to implement the idea. Shortly thereafter, Jović was defeated in the election for the Croat 
                                                
46	Sperling,	Valerie.	(2009).	Altered	states:	The	globalization	of	accountability	/	Valerie	Sperling.	Cambridge;	New	York:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	144.	
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member of the Presidency.47 The official who replaced him, Željko Komšić, politically identified 
as a Bosnian Croat, and as a member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH), rather than the 
right-wing Croat Democratic Union (HDZ BiH), and therefore was not viewed as a legitimate 
replacement by many Bosnian Croats who claimed that because the SDP BiH was primarily 
supported by Bosniak voters, he was falsely elected to represent Bosnian Croats.48 Bosnian 
Croats feared that because Komšić was not a nationalist, their constitutive status could be 
undermined by Bosniak voters. Komšić was re-elected in 2010. Because they are fewer in 
numbers, Croats see reintegration as favorable to Bosniaks, and nationalist arguments see it is a 
threat to Croat identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.49  
Part of that threat has to do with religious affiliations, as faith plays a large role in the 
identities of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. As mentioned, Bosnian Croats are predominantly 
Catholic and the Church in BiH receives influence and assistance from the Church in Croatia, 
which receives assistance from the state due to a treaty that was signed between the Croatian 
government and the Vatican in return for the Vatican’s recognition of Croatia’s sovereignty.50 
Nationalist arguments stress that Croats are a Christian nation, and in more recent years have 
been concerned with the rise of Islam among Bosniaks. 
                                                
47	As	will	be	detailed	more	in	the	next	chapter,	Bosnia-Herzegovina	has	a	three-member	Presidency.	There	is	a	representative	
from	each	of	the	three	constitutive	nations.		
48	The	following	article	states	that	Komšić	received	about	four	times	as	many	Bosniak	than	Bosnian	Croat	votes.	However,	it	also	
states	that	he	received	support	in	parts	of	Western	Herzegovina	that	were	predominantly	Croat:	Jutarnji	List:	
http://www.jutarnji.hr/izbori-u-bih--nije-tocno-da-hrvati-nisu-glasali-za-zeljka-komsica--u-grudama-je-dobio-124-glasa-
/893048/	(Retrieved	January	17,	2016).			
49 Azra	Hromadžić	(2008)	conducted	ethnographic	research	on	the	administrative	reunification	of	the	well	known	Mostar	
Gymnasium,	and	writes:	“…integration	was	understood	as	forced	incorporation	into	a	seemingly	equal	power-sharing	pluralist	
BiH	state,	which	for	most	Croats,	is	experienced	as	one	of	Bosniak	hegemony.”	Hromadžić,	A.	(2008).	Discourses	of	Integration	
and	Practices	of	Reunification	at	the	Mostar	Gymnasium,	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	Comparative	Education	Review,	52(4),	541-
563. 
50	Hedl,	D.	(2016,	January	16).	MOST	Has	Put	the	Church	in	Power	in	Croatia.	Retrieved	January	20,	2016,	from	
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/most-has-put-the-church-in-power-in-croatia-01-12-2016.		
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When considering Bosniak nationalism, it is important to see that it is fairly similar to 
Croat nationalism, as far as language and religion is concerned. As briefly mentioned earlier, 
Bosniaks refer to their language as Bosnian because that is the name of the language of the 
Bosnian people, but as Serb and Croat nationalists argue, this is also a political move because it 
makes Bosniaks appear as the “true natives” of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When it comes to religion 
among Bosniaks, Islam has become more visibly noticeable in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the 
break up of Yugoslavia.  
During the war, the Bosniak-run government in Sarajevo received financial assistance 
from various Middle Eastern countries. In addition, though the figures are disputed, mujahideen 
fighters also came to Bosnia-Herzegovina and aided Bosniak efforts, but it is fair to say that they 
were never under strict control by the Sarajevo government.51 Croat and Serb nationalists saw 
this as the greatest of threats and argued that Bosnian Muslims were trying to turn Bosnia-
Herzegovina into an Islamic state, but this was denied by the Sarajevo government. However, as 
a result of the influx of foreign fighters and Middle Eastern support, a conservative branch of 
Islam, known as the Wahhabi, came to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has challenged the more 
relaxed and traditional Bosniak Islam.52  
One of the primary ways that Bosniak nationalism differs from Croat and Serb 
nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that it advocates for a centralized form of government, 
with Sarajevo as the capital. Part of the reason for this has to do with the fact that Bosniaks are 
the largest of the constitutive nations, and a centralized form of government would mean that 
                                                
51	Shrader	(2003,	ibid.,	51-52)	notes	that	mujahideen	paramilitary	groups	in	Bosnia-Herzegovina,	were	often	at	odds	with	their	
Bosniak	commanding	officers	because	of	cultural	differences.	For	instance,	Bosniak	Muslims	consumed	alcohol	and	pork	and	
did	not	share	many	of	the	conservative	beliefs	that	the	Mujahideen	brought	with	them.	
52	For	an	analysis	of	Bosniak	Islam,	see	Merdjanova,	I.	(2013).	Rediscovering	the	Umma:	Muslims	in	the	Balkans	Between	
Nationalism	and	Transnationalism.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
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they would have a majority status. The goals of Bosniak nationalists are more in line with those 
of the international community, and advocate reform. This is possibly due to the potential for a 
majority status, but at the same time, the call for a centralized government is tied to Bosniak 
victimhood during the war. It is reported that 65 percent of the total casualties were Bosniaks, 25 
percent Serbs, and 8 percent Croats.53  
 
Research Design 
My research interests are shaped by my personal and academic experience. I am a 
Bosnian Croat from Central Bosnia, who moved to the United States in September 1996, when I 
was in the second grade. After moving to Des Moines, Iowa, I was privileged with the 
opportunity and educated in a Catholic school, and did not come into frequent contact with many 
Bosnians. I often found myself explaining my background to my American peers, and realizing 
that I did not know enough about the events in BiH myself. Upon graduating from high school in 
2007, I came into contact with anthropology at Iowa State University, and began to formulate 
answers to some of the questions I had concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
I have been fortunate enough to be able to visit BiH for approximately a month at a time 
during 2000, 2005, 2008, 2013, and two months during the summer of 2015, specifically for this 
project. My journeys prior to this study allowed me to maintain an interest in the culture, as well 
as to develop my familial and social kin networks in the region. At the same time, these visits 
allowed me to further my knowledge of the language, which enabled me to engage in discussions 
with participants on a fairly informal level, as well as closer examine current news and past 
documents. I chose the Central Bosnia Canton as the site of my research study partly because my 
                                                
53	Ahmetasevic,	N.	(2007,	June	19).	“JUSTICE	REPORT:	Bosnia's	Book	of	the	Dead.”	Retrieved	on	January	17,	2016	from		
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/justice-report-bosnia-s-book-of-the-dead.		
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existing networks in BiH are located there, but largely because it is officially an ethnically mixed 
canton (Bosniaks and Croats) and the “two schools under one roof” program is in effect in this 
area. My goal was to see whether there had been any formal response in the Central Bosnia 
Canton to the 2014 Supreme Court ruling, and if there had not, what local attitudes regarding 
such a ruling were, along with attitudes about the “two schools under one roof” program, and 
ethnically-divided education in general.  
When I arrived in the Central Bosnia Canton, I contacted members of my existing 
networks and shared with them the nature of my study. Relying on their advice, I reached out to 
potential participants, and spoke with individuals who had ties to education in the area, as well as 
with recent graduates of the local schools. I visited three schools and one learning center in the 
Central Bosnia Canton, and briefly met with the directors.54 When I met with these individuals, I 
mentioned my local background, and I also I referenced literature by Bosnian scholars which had 
influenced my own study. Upon doing so, my only actual question for participants pertained to 
whether they had heard about the 2014 Supreme Court ruling in the FBiH, which upheld a 2012 
Mostar Municipal Court decision that found the “two schools under one roof” program 
discriminatory, and unconstitutional.55  
I asked only this question in my meetings with participants because it enabled me to 
answer whether there was a formal response to the court ruling in this canton (as in proposed 
reunification of the ethnically-divided classrooms and curriculums), and because I was slightly 
unsure about initiating discussions with participants regarding the divisions in education. 
                                                
54	When	I	arrived	in	Central	Bosnia	on	5/26/2015,	the	school	year	was	only	a	couple	of	weeks	away	from	being	over,	so	the	
timing	of	my	study	was	not	expertly	chosen.	
55	Engelhart,	K.	(2014,	November	5).	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Court	Orders	End	to	Ethnic	Segregation	of	Schoolchildren	|	VICE	News.	
Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	https://news.vice.com/article/bosnia-herzegovina-court-orders-end-to-ethnic-segregation-of-
schoolchildren.		
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Although education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina is part of an ongoing dialogue among those 
interested in the development of the country, it is a sensitive topic nonetheless. My general 
approach to discussions with participants was to link this research study to my personal 
education and my ties to the area, as a result of which, I was interested in the legislation being 
implemented as Bosnia-Herzegovina progresses towards European Union membership. This 
allowed me to address my research design, but to engage in conversations on participants’ terms. 
I briefly reflect on this approach to discussions with participants in the fourth chapter, in addition 
to the discussions themselves. 
Based on my findings, there have not been any immediate or proposed changes to the 
divided system of education in the Central Bosnia Canton to reflect the 2014 Supreme Court 
ruling. In addition, while many of my participants indicated they had not directly heard about the 
2014 Supreme Court ruling, they were familiar with the debate at hand. To me, this verified the 
difficulty of implementing reforms, and led me to re-focus elements of my study to look at the 
deeper political and financial problems BiH faces.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. As this 
discussion develops, I narrow in on the specific focus and area of study, which is ethnically-
divided education and the “two schools under one roof” program in the Central Bosnia Canton, 
but initially I provide an overview of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, and present a series of 
discussions aimed at understanding why there have not been any immediate or proposed changes 
to reflect the 2014 Supreme Court ruling.   
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Chapter II presents background information that is necessary for understanding the 
current socio-economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I detail the State in BiH, and provide 
insight into recent developments concerning the country’s path to membership in the European 
Union. In this chapter, I discuss the ethno-national tensions that continue to plague the country, 
arguing that the political and economic problems have overshadowed reform efforts aimed at 
reintegration. 
Chapter III provides an overview of post-war education in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I 
specifically focus on the “two schools under one roof” program in the FBiH, but I shine light on 
other ways ethnically-divided education takes place throughout the country as well. By breaking 
down the political and administrative side of ethnically-divided education, I demonstrate that 
reform is difficult to implement, both from the top-down and the bottom-up.  
Chapter IV contains a brief survey of the attitudes that Bosniak and Croats in a mixed, 
semi-rural town in the Central Bosnia Canton have towards the 2014 Supreme Court ruling in the 
FBiH that found the “two schools under one roof” program unconstitutional. I explore the “two 
schools under one roof” in this area, as well as local attitudes regarding education reform and 
reintegration, and find that there have not been any proposed changes to the local schools to 
reflect the court ruling. In addition, I provide a snapshot of the circumstances students in a semi-
rural mixed town in the Central Bosnia Canton face upon graduating from a system of ethnically-
divided education. In doing so I argue that the general population is more desirous of economic 
stability as opposed to ethno-national autonomy, but that nationalist resistance to reforms has 
enabled divisions to continue.  
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CHAPTER II: STATE-BUILDING, ETHNO-NATIONALISM, AND REFORM 
DIFFICULTIES IN POST-WAR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
 
Introduction 
The post-war period in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been described as “a system of 
institutionalized crisis.”56 As noted in the previous chapter, the Dayton Peace Accords, although 
effective in bringing about an end to the violence in BiH, resulted in the partitioning of the 
country along ethnic lines, and ethnicity as the main factor in Bosnian political identity. 
Considering once more that ethno-national leaders directed violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
reduce the population into homogenous bases of support while they secured state enterprises in 
the ongoing liberalization of the region, it is possible to see there is validity to the phrase 
“institutionalized crisis,” and that the discouraging state-building efforts in BiH originate out of 
this premise. In addition, Mujanovic notes what emerged during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was a “patriotic mafia,” who preached “national liberation” and “the defense of our people,” but 
in reality pursued profiteering and privatization schemes.57 It has been twenty years since the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, and the lack of significant progress in reform efforts 
makes it worthwhile to examine the democratic conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
In this chapter, I detail the state in BiH, and provide insight into the power-sharing 
mechanisms established in the Dayton Peace Accords. I describe the post-war reform efforts and 
show that the Bosnian state remains a fragile one. Although the international community has 
invested heavily in the country thus far, the failures to cooperate by those in power indicate its 
presence is still necessary. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s leaders have repeatedly agreed to work 
                                                
56	Mujanovic,	J.	(2014)	“Institutionalized	Crisis:	The	Case	of	Post-War	Dayton	Bosnia-Herzegovina.	In	the	book	Shannon,	D.	The	
End	of	the	World	as	we	Know	it?	Crisis,	Resistance,	and	the	Age	of	Austerity	/	edited	by	Deric	Shannon.	Edinburgh,	Scotland:	
Oakland,	CA:	AK	Press.	107-119.	107.		
57	ibid.	107-109.	
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together on paper, but many reforms designed to empower the national government have yet to 
be implemented. In addition, rather than open support for reconciliation, BiH’s ethno-national 
leaders have sought autonomy, and questioned the legitimacy of the Bosnian state.  
As a result, I find it necessary to highlight the incompatibilities between the European 
Union state-building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the desires of BiH’s ethno-national 
leaders. At the same time, the ongoing events in the region draw attention to this matter because 
whether BiH “succeeds” in achieving European Union membership also hinges on the EU’s 
continued development. In this chapter, I show that resistance to reform efforts has enabled 
BiH’s ethno-national elites to continue to profit and to serve those who ensure their political 
power, rather than all of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s citizens. As will be detailed more in the next 
chapter, this has allowed ethnically-divided education to continue, resulting in the use of schools 
for the reproduction of ethno-national identities, rather than as forums for cohesion and the 
interaction of a common citizenry.  
 
Background 
Prior to the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of six Yugoslav republics, and was 
classified as a mid-developed country, with a well-developed educational system.58 Amidst the 
collapse of communism, Yugoslavia also dissolved, and war broke out in 1991, first in Slovenia 
and Croatia, then more bitterly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the work of V.P. Gagnon shows, the 
war in BiH was waged by ethno-national leaders primarily based in Zagreb and Belgrade and 
carried out by their allies throughout the country. Adila Pašalić Kreso notes that a significant 
population shift took place during the war:  
                                                
58 Dizdar,	S.	(1998).	A	development	and	perspectives	of	teacher	education	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	Ministry	of	Education,	
Science,	Culture	and	Sports. 
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Not only did the population shift from rural to urban areas, but refugees from certain 
areas had to flee to areas controlled by people of their own nationality in order to escape 
the ethnic cleansing – in particular of non-Serbian populations – and live in safety.59 
 
This territorialization was meant to facilitate the breakup of the country; areas that Croats 
occupied were to be absorbed into a “Greater Croatia,” while Serb areas were to remain part of 
what was left of Yugoslavia. The remaining area, a sliver running north to south, was to remain 
for Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). However, as a result of international involvement, a peace 
agreement was brokered by the United States, one that created a consociational democracy based 
on the ethno-national and territorial divisions fostered during the war. As will be discussed more 
in the next chapter, this resulted in the creation of separate ministries of education at multiple 
levels of government.  
Bosnia-Herzegovina is composed of two autonomous entities, the Federation of BiH, 
further divided into ten independent cantons, and the Republika Srpska.60 There is also a jointly-
administered, but separately governed, “District of Brčko,” located in the northeast.61 The 
cantons in the Federation are divided into 79 municipalities, while the Republika Srpska is more 
centralized in comparison, with 63 municipalities.  
                                                
59	Kreso,	Adila	Pašalić.	(2008).	Ibid.,	p.	357.	
60	The	ten	cantons	in	the	Federation	of	BiH	are:	1.	Una-Sana;	2.	Posavina;	3.	Tuzla;	4.	Zenica-Doboj;	5	Bosnian	Podrinje;	6.	
Central	Bosnia;	7.	Herzegovina-Neretva;	8.	West	Herzegovina;	9.	Sarajevo;	10.	Herzeg-Bosnia	or	Canton	10.	
61	The	District	of	Brčko	is	located	near	Canton	2	on	the	map.		
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Figure 3. Map of BiH with Cantons. Source: Spirit of Bosnia 
The national government is located in Sarajevo, and is headed by three Presidents, three 
Vice-Presidents, a Council of Ministers, and a bicameral legislative branch. There is also a 
Constitutional Court, a High Judicial Court, and a State Prosecutor’s Office. The Bosniak and 
Croat members of the Presidency are elected by voters in the Federation, while the Serb member 
is elected by voters in the Republika Srpska. The presidential term is four years, and the three 
members rotate for the main position every eight months, beginning with whoever receives the 
most votes. The members of the Presidency do not wield tremendous domestic powers, but they 
do represent BiH in foreign affairs, and appoint the Chair of the Council of Ministers. 
The highest governmental authority rests in the hands of the internationally-appointed 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), who is able to suspend any state or entity laws, and 
remove elected officials deemed a threat to the security of the state.62 The OHR reports to the 
                                                
62	Patrice	McMahon	writes:	“When	the	OHR	was	created,	it	had	no	institutional	base	to	carry	out	its	goals.	As	of	January	2003,	it	
had	a	staff	of	over	700	and	an	annual	budget	of	about	$20	million.	Its	growth	in	numbers	matches	the	increasing	powers	it	has	
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Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC SB), an assembly of delegates from 
various national governments.63 The PIC SB has established a set of objectives and conditions 
that must be met for the closure of the OHR.64 One objective was completed when the 
Parliamentary Assembly in BiH recognized the self-governance of the District of Brčko. 
At the entity level, the Federation also has a President and two Vice Presidents, as well as 
a Prime Minister, appointed by its bicameral legislative branch. The Republika Srpska has a 
President and two Vice Presidents, but due to the Serb majority, power usually resides in the 
hands of the Serb President. The Republika Srpska has a Prime Minister and a unicameral 
legislature called the National Assembly. There is a separate Legislative Assembly and Mayor 
for the District of Brčko. Within the Federation of BiH, there are ten cantonal governments, and 
throughout BiH, individual municipal governments.  
As mentioned, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina formally recognizes three 
constitutive nations/constituent peoples: Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats, as well as several minority 
groups. Leaders of the constitutive nations have the power to nullify legislation deemed a threat 
to their national autonomy through a “vital national interest” veto, which has impeded reform 
and reintegration efforts. The veto was established to protect the groups from systematic 
marginalization in the post-war period, but it has been used by ethno-national leaders to preserve 
the decentralized government and a weak state. For instance, the Constitution of Bosnia-
                                                
been	given	in	recent	years.”	The	powers	of	the	OHR	were	expanded	in	1997	under	the	“Bonn	Powers,”	and	by	2001,	over	100	
laws	were	enacted	by	the	OHR.	McMahon	argues	that	the	presence	of	the	OHR	has	further	weakened	the	BiH	state.		
McMahon,	P.	C.	(2004).	“Rebuilding	Bosnia:	A	Model	to	Emulate	or	to	Avoid?”	Political	Science	Quarterly,	119(4),	569-593,	Pg.	
587		
63	The	PIC’s	Steering	Board	members	are	Canada,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	Japan,	Russia,	the	UK,	the	US,	the	EU	presidency,	the	
European	Commission	and	the	Organization	of	the	Islamic	Conference,	represented	by	Turkey.	
64	The	objectives	and	conditions	set	by	the	PIC	are:	the	resolution	of	state	property;	resolution	of	defense	property;	completion	
of	the	Brčko	final	award	(completed);	fiscal	sustainability	of	the	state;	and	entrenchment	of	the	rule	of	law.	The	two	conditions	
are	signing	the	Stabilization	and	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU	(completed),	and	obtaining	a	positive	assessment	of	the	
situation	from	the	PIC.		
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Herzegovina, established in Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords, states that only individuals 
belonging to one of the three constitutive nations are able to hold office in many elected 
positions, whereas members of minority groups such as Roma, Jews, and self-declared Bosnians 
are excluded.65  
Even though the European court of Human Rights ruled in 2009 that the country’s 
constitution violates minority rights when it excludes Jewish and Roma people from standing for 
either the three-member Presidency or the House of Peoples, ethno-national leaders have used 
the veto to strike down proposed amendments to the constitution. In the case of Bosnian Croats, 
the stated concern has been that a non-Croat could be elected as the Croat representative to the 
Presidency, which could result in Croats being outvoted on important matters. At the same time, 
it is possible to see that ethno-national leaders have used the democratic institutions available to 
retain their hold on power while the people who have an interest in changing the current situation 
are excluded from participation.  
 
State-building Efforts and Ethno-national Resistance 
In the following section, I analyze the post-war reform efforts in two periods, the first 
from 1996-2006, and the second from 2006-present. In doing so, I wish to draw attention to the 
fact that there has been a noticeable withdrawal of the International Community from BiH in 
more recent years, possibly due to conflicts and matters of interest elsewhere, but perhaps also 
due to assumptions that Bosnia-Herzegovina is ready to assume self-governance. While the 
                                                
65	On	22	December	2009,	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	ordered	the	abolition	of	discriminatory	restrictions	
against	the	Jewish	and	Roma	people.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016	from		
http://minorityrights.org/publications/discrimination-and-political-participation-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-march-2010/.		
See	the	following	January	2016	BBC	interview	with	BiH	Foreign	Minister	Igor	Crnadak	for	more	on	the	failures	to	amend	the	
Bosnian	constitution	to	reflect	the	ECtHR	Sejdic-Finci	vs	BiH	court	case:	http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06z1dvh.	
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international community (the EU, and to a slightly lesser degree, the U.S.) has invested heavily 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus far, a closer look at the successes and failures of the post-war reform 
efforts indicates that the international presence in BiH remains necessary.  
The initial post-war reforms included the transformation of various institutions to 
coincide with the Dayton Peace Accords, as well as the creation of a single currency and a 
Central Bank. There were also wide-ranging military, police, and security reform efforts in this 
period, which were largely successful.66 In 2005, Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed to work towards a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, a plan for 
membership, but state’s ability to adopt the SAA mandates had been in doubt even then due to 
the decentralized nature of the government.67  
In 2006, the U.S. and the EU launched a formal effort to revise Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
constitution, known as the “April Package,” but it was defeated by two votes in the state 
parliament.68 As Sofia Sebastian notes: 
While all major Serb parties, both Bosniak parties…and the Croat HDZ BiH stayed 
firmly behind the April Package, [The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina] SBiH, the only 
Bosniak party that withdrew from negotiations in the last stage, and the Croat HDZ 1990 
– a [more conservative] splinter of HDZ BiH created shortly prior to the voting of the AP 
- rejected the package along with other independent MPs.69  
 
Sebastian points to ethno-national tensions, but also to disputes between administrations within 
cantons as reasons for the rejection of the package, in addition to misinformation among 
                                                
66	Mujanovic,	J.	(2014)	ibid.,	109-111.	
67	Perry	(2010)	underlines	that	the	number	of	BiH	Ministers	of	Parliament	is	“strikingly	small:		
The	Parliamentary	Assembly	of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	consists	of	a	15-member	House	of	Peoples	(upper	House)	and	
a	42-member	House	of	Representatives	(lower	House),	and	is	the	smallest	bicameral	state	legislature	in	Europe.	Many	
functions	often	held	by	the	state	are	in	BiH	decentralized,	accounting	in	part	for	this	discrepancy.”		
Perry,	V.	(2010).	Fifteen	Years	of	the	Human	Dimension	in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	—	The	Ebb	and	Flow	of	State-building.	
Security	and	Human	Rights,	21(4),	279-291.	Pg.	282 
68	Mujanovic	(2014,	ibid.,	109-111)	explains	that	the	purpose	of	this	was	to	align	Bosnia’s	state-level	institutions	with	EU	and	
NATO	policies,	for	eventual	membership	in	both.		
69	Sebastian,	S.	(2007)	Leaving	Behind	Dayton:	Constitutional	Reform	in	BiH.	Madrid:	Fundacion	para	las	Relaciones	
Internacionales	y	el	Dialogo	Exterior,	6.		
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members of the state parliament who assumed acceptance of the April Package would mean 
approval of the Dayton-established constitution of BiH, which was not voted on in the state 
parliament.70 
It is perhaps not surprising then, that the second period of reform efforts in BiH has fared 
less well, and has been met with opposition by nationalist leaders. In particular, then Prime 
Minister and current President of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, opposed reforms aimed 
at a centralized government, and has argued that the 1996-2006 reforms stripped the Republika 
Srpska of its autonomy. After the April Package was defeated, Dodik claimed that any 
subsequent reform efforts would have to recognize the autonomy of the Republika Srpska, and 
proceed from there. This was opposed by the Bosniak leader of the Party for BiH (SBiH), Haris 
Siljadzic, who called for a BiH without entity-level voting, and a strong state government.71  
The SAA was signed in June 2008, but it was frozen the following year because BiH’s 
ruling parties failed to agree on an amendment to the constitution to reflect the “Sejdic-Finci” 
court case. However, this was not the only condition needed to unlock the SAA, and further 
attempts to satisfy the requirements were faced with challenges.72 While the SAA was in 
development, the Interim Agreement (IA) was enacted, which focused on fulfilling the trade-
related portions of the SAA.73 The Interim Agreement enabled BiH to export agricultural goods 
                                                
70	Perry	(2010,	ibid.,	282)	reports:	“The	BiH	Parliamentary	Assembly	(PA)	adopted	239	laws	in	its	four-year	mandate	from	2002-
2006	compared	to	the	adoption	of	168	laws	by	the	PA	between	2006-2010	(78	laws	were	rejected	in	the	Parliamentary	
Assembly	from	2006-2010	due	to	the	entity	vote	provision).”	If	a	law	is	adopted	at	the	national	level,	it	must	also	be	approved	
at	the	entity	level	before	it	is	implemented.	Ibid.		
71	Mujanovic,	J.	(2013).	Reclaiming	the	Political	in	Bosnia:	A	Critique	of	the	Legal-Rational	Nightmare	of	Contemporary	Bosnian	
Statehood.	Theory	in	Action,	6(2),	109-147.	115	
72	The	2009	European	Commission	Report	for	BiH	states:	“The	overall	political	climate	has	deteriorated	in	recent	months	and	
the	[constitutional	amendment]	process	has	been	discontinued.”	Pg.	8.	
73	Other	conditions	in	the	SAA	required	BiH	to	implement	a	state	aid	law,	conduct	a	national	census,	and	close	the	Office	of	the	
High	Representative	(OHR).	The	last	condition	was	removed	in	2010	by	the	EU	and	the	OHR	remains	in	function.	A	state	aid	law	
was	adopted	in	2012,	but	it	was	not	implemented.	The	first	post-war	census	was	conducted	in	October	2013,	and	preliminary	
results	were	released.	The	census	is	scheduled	for	publication	in	June,	2016.	It	was	delayed	due	to	a	dispute	between	the	
Statistical	Agencies	of	the	FBiH	and	the	Republika	Srpska,	concerning	use	of	the	word	“Muslim”	to	refer	to	an	ethnic	group.	In	
2014,	the	amendment	to	the	BiH	constitution	related	to	the	“Sejdic-Finci”	court	case	was	also	dropped	from	the	list	of	
conditions	required	to	unlock	the	SAA.		
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to the EU market almost entirely without fees. In 2009, the U.S. and the E.U. attempted to 
reform the constitution in BiH once more in a series of discussions referred to as the “Butmir 
Process,” which included proposals similar to those introduced in 2006. The goals of the Butmir 
Process were to empower the Prime Minister, and disempower the House of Peoples, in order to 
reduce it to a committee of the House of Representatives.74 The same year, the European 
Commission (EC) allocated nearly 90 million euros to BiH under the 2009 Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA) program.75 These meetings added to the level of political deadlock in 
BiH at the time, which carried over into the 2010 elections, held in October.  
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the re-election of Željko Komšić to the Presidency 
as the Croat representative was additional fuel for discourse, and rhetoric calling for a “third 
entity” by the Croats and secession by the Serbs persisted. While both Komšić and the Bosniak 
representative Bakir Izetbegtović were reported to be moderate candidates, the parties elected at 
the entity level, including Milorad Dodik winning the Presidency of the Republika Srpska, were 
less cooperative, and a national government was not immediately formed. Seven months after the 
elections, only the government of Republika Srpska was ready, and discussions among the 
parties attempting to form a coalition in the Federation had stalled. On March 17, 2011, two 
Muslim parties and a Croat party formed a coalition in an attempt to bypass the parties who had 
failed to do so, but the electoral commission ruled that they had formed illegally. High 
Representative Valentin Inzko overturned this decision, which was followed by a response by 
nine Croat parties who issued a joint statement that said, “Inzko’s move reduced [Bosnian] 
Croats to ‘lower than a national minority’ and that it favour[ed] the Muslim majority.” In the city 
of Mostar, considered by nationalists the “Croat capital” in BiH, Bosnian Croat parties 
                                                
74	Anderson,	L.	D.	(2013).	Federal	solutions	to	ethnic	problems:	Accommodating	diversity.	New	York:	Routledge,	Pg.	40.	
75	The	2009	IPA	Programme	was	also	intended	to	alleviate	the	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	in	BiH.		
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established a Croat National Assembly.76  
Meanwhile, the National Assembly in the Republika Srpska started to debate the 
legitimacy of the state-level judicial institutions, and President Dodik began to call for a 
referendum to abolish the federal court and State Prosecutor’s Office. He accused these 
institutions of an anti-Serb bias, and of undermining Republika Srpska’s autonomy.77 Eight 
months after the general elections, the country formed a Parliamentary Assembly, and Dodik 
announced that the Republika Srpska would seek to challenge several legal developments in 
Sarajevo.78 At the PIC Steering Board meeting in May 2011, High Representative Inzko reported 
that the political parties were employing zero-sum politics, and that the country was facing the 
highest tensions since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.79 In September 2011, the office 
of European Union Special Representative (EUSOR) was opened, and was assigned with helping 
BiH progress towards EU membership. This was previously the responsibility of the OHR, now 
tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.80 
The same year, the International Crisis Group reported that Republika Srpska President 
Milorad Dodik’s anti-reformist stance was potentially motivated by concerns that state 
prosecutors would indict him for corruption, or mis-use of office.81 And not to single out Dodik, 
the leader of the Alliance for a Better Future of BiH (SBB-BiH), Fahrudin Radončić, was 
implicated in a corruption scandal involving the Federation Development Bank. Radončić is the 
founder of BiH’s largest newspaper, the Dnevni Avaz, and has used the platform to wage a 
                                                
76	Hadzovic,	E.	(2011,	April	19).	Bosnian	Croats	Form	National	Assembly.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-croats-to-form-the-national-assemly	
77	Mujanovic	(2014)	ibid.	Pg.	114.	
78	Security	Council	Report	-	November	2011.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016	from	http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-
forecast/2011-11/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_7811243.php.		
79	ibid.			
80	ibid.		
81	ICG.	Bosnia:	What	Does	Republika	Srpska	Want?	International	Crisis	Group,	2011.	Pg.	8.		
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media attack against the federal authorities. Similarly, Dragan Čović, the current Croat 
representative to the Presidency, was sentenced to five years in prison in 2006, for abuse of 
office during his time as Finance Minister of the Federation. Čović appealed the 2006 conviction, 
and as of 2011, the case had only just returned to the courts. Croat media sources in BiH have 
portrayed Čović’s legal troubles as a “Bosniak-orchestrated witch-trial.”82  
More recently, Dodik has been embroiled in a case regarding financial crimes related to a 
real-estate purchase in Belgrade, and the State Prosecutor’s Office is currently investigating 
associated individuals and institutions.83 The same can be said for Radončić, who was arrested in 
January of this year for allegedly tampering with a witness in a trial in Kosovo dealing with one 
of the leading criminals in the Balkans.84 Although these recent developments are not outright 
convictions of guilt, they do provide insight into the state of the rule of law in BiH. Similarly, the 
behavior and actions of elites set an example for the rest of society.  
As can be seen, corruption, defined by Gupta as “a violation of norms and standards of 
conduct,” remains a problem in BiH, and many high-ranking officials are reported to have gained 
their status and wealth during the course of the war.85 Reports in 2011 estimated BiH was losing 
approximately 340 million dollars a year in international and local investment, and this number 
was predicted to grow in 2012.86 The EU has attempted to tackle this problem by strengthening 
state-level law enforcement agencies, but official support and public faith in these remains 
                                                
82	Mujanovic,	J.	(2013).	Ibid.,	Pg.	116.	
83	Hedl,	D.,	&	Latal,	S.	(2016,	January	20).	Bosnia	Bank	Probe	Centers	on	Dodik	Villa	Loan.	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	from	
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weak.87 Anthropologists interested in the existence of informal networks have commented that 
informal networks during socialism were often necessary to gain access to a variety of public 
goods, as well as entrance to a university or a job. Sampson, in particular, notes that the “same 
informal relations which inhibit institutions from functioning are those which have enabled 
Balkan peoples to survive subjugation by foreign powers, authoritarian politicians, and countless 
wars and betrayals.”88 It is possible to say that informal networks during socialism were not 
strictly oppositional to formal bureaucratic institutions, they were somewhat complementary. In 
addition, anthropological research on corruption reveals that the practice exists in varying forms 
and to varying degrees; the partition between formal and informal is not strictly dichotomous. 
 
Developmental desires 
The successes and failures of the post-2006 reform period indicate Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
undergoing what Carothers refers to as a “non-linear” transition towards socio-economic 
democratization.89 On the other hand, Timothy Donais states that the reform record in BiH 
“raises questions about the extent to which reforms aimed at advancing the rule of law…can be a 
cause, rather than a consequence, of broader socio-political change, particularly in contexts 
where domestic political actors possess robust powers of veto.90 While the International 
Community has worked to strengthen the state-level institutions, it is important to see that 
                                                
87	Transparency	International’s	2015	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	ranks	BiH	as	76th	out	of	168	countries	and	territories,	and	
reports	a	score	of	38/100	for	the	perceived	level	of	public	sector	corruption.	In	2011,	BiH	ranked	91st,	which	implies	there	has	
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2010,	ibid.	Pg.	286)	
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34 
 
relatively little has been done to foster a true democratic society.  
Perhaps, as David Chandler suggests, there is a mis-match between the goals of the 
organizations working in BiH, and the interests of the Bosnian society.91 Chandler notes that the 
military and humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first major project since 
the U.S.-led occupations of Germany and Japan following WWII. As a result, Bosnia-
Herzegovina emerged as “a template for new experiments in international administration and 
external assistance in state reconstruction and post-conflict reconciliation.”92 However, as 
Gagnon states:  
There is very little evidence that the wider population supported wholesale adoption of 
the kind of neoliberal capitalism that would come to dominate Western policy toward the 
region, with its focus on rapid and widespread privatization of state enterprises at the cost 
of jobs and social stability, and the reduction or elimination of state intervention in the 
economy. Their preference ranged from a more democratic and efficient form of the 
existing socialist system at the end of 1980 to the desire for a social market system, that 
is, a capitalist economy, but with the state assuring priority goals of social justice and full 
employment, by the end of the 1990s.93  
 
Nevertheless, international actors such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Mission in BiH 
(UNMBiH), and numerous international NGOs, including USAID, Save the Children, and Red 
Cross have worked to promote civil society, largely by providing financial support to local 
grassroots organizations.94 According to Thomas Carothers, local organizations in BiH receiving 
international support can be divided into two broad categories—democracy NGOs and 
development NGOs.95 Democracy NGOs are devoted to issues such as human rights and the 
environment, while development NGOs seek to empower the population in order to build a civil 
                                                
91	Chandler,	D.	(2000).	Bosnia:	Faking	Democracy	after	Dayton.	Pluto	Press.	Pg.	150. 
92	Chandler,	D.	(2006).	Peace	without	politics?	Ten	years	of	international	state-building	in	Bosnia.	Routledge.	Pg.	1.	
93	Gagnon,	V.	(2004),	ibid.	Pg.	183	n2.	
94	International	Crisis	Group	(2001).	“Bosnia:	Reshaping	the	International	Machinery.”	Report	121,	November	29.		
95	Carothers,	T.	(1999).	Aiding	Democracy	Abroad:	The	Learning	Curve.	Washington,	D.C.:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	
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society and functioning state.96 Patrice McMahon reports that most of the NGOs receiving 
international support in BiH are development NGOs, and it is difficult to assess the effects of this 
strategy on democratization.97 In addition, organizations allied with the nationalist parties further 
deter those wishing to avoid ties to them. Figures from 2000 provide a glimpse into the types of 
organizations present in BiH at the time:  
By 1999, over 173 international and 365 local NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, 
foreign embassies, and government ministries were involved in civil society work, with 
more than 200 of these groups identifying civil society as a specific category of their 
work.98 
 
In 2000, over one hundred of these groups were reported to be working on women’s issues, 
which included providing support for victims of violence and displacement, work training 
programs, and promoting awareness of women’s rights.99 On the other hand, McMahon reports 
that while scores of NGOs were created in BiH in the initial post-war period, many have since 
collapsed, and this has left the remaining organizations competing for international support when 
they could be working together towards similar objectives.100 He explains that this is 
troublesome because it contributes to new hierarchies among communities, with those 
organizations who are supported at the top, and those who are not at the bottom.  
 
Recent Developments 
Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced a series of unrests, beginning in June 2013, and while 
the country’s leaders have renewed their commitments to work towards EU membership, the 
unrests deserve a closer look because for the most part they did not arise out of ethnic 
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98	ibid.	
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differences, but out of joint economic struggles. The November 2013 Security Council Report 
for BiH states that unrests began when the ruling parties failed to pass legislation on national 
identification numbers, as a result of which ID documents could not be issued for new-born 
babies:  
Frustration boiled over when a three-month-old girl, who later died on 15 October, could 
not go to Germany for medical treatment because a passport could not be obtained for 
her. On 6 June, demonstrators surrounded the parliament building in Sarajevo, trapping 
more than 1,000 lawmakers, government employees and foreign visitors inside until early 
morning hours the next day.101 
 
The failure to pass legislation stemmed from a dispute between Bosniak, Croat, and Serb 
lawmakers in BiH’s central parliament.102 Bosniak and Croat legislators had rejected Serb 
demands for separate identification numbers, as the goal was to pass a national law ID law. 
Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court of BiH ordered a halt to the registration of newborns until 
the dispute was settled. This left all babies born since February 2013 without identity numbers, 
which meant they could not be issued passports or medical cards. While an ID law was passed in 
the lower house of the legislature on July 18, 2013, it was rejected in the upper house five days 
later. A revised version of the ID law was passed on November 5, one that “bowed to the 
demands of Bosnia’s autonomous Serb Republic.”103  
Larger protests occurred in February 2014, which swept across the country. The second 
wave of unrest began on February 5, when residents in Tuzla demonstrated with former workers 
of five recently privatized and declared bankrupt factories. Protests spread to other large cities in 
BiH, including Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, and Bihac. The reasons for the protests in these areas 
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also included high unemployment and political corruption. The May 2014 Security Council 
Report for BiH states that protestors set fire to the Sarajevo cantonal government headquarters 
and the Presidency building on February 7, and in total, eighteen government buildings across 
the Federation of BiH were “razed.”104 However, after the initial wave of demonstrations, 
gatherings were more peaceful.  
On February 11, 2014, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council issued a 
statement denouncing the violence and destruction of the protests, but called on local leaders to 
consider the protestors’ legitimate demands. The February protests resulted in the resignation of 
four cantonal governments, most notably the Tuzla government. The protests also resulted in the 
creation of forums in public areas of cities and towns in the Federation of BiH, locally referred to 
as “plenums,” in which citizens continued to discuss the problems facing their communities. 
Later that year, Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered severe floods, which displaced more than 90,000 
people, and resulted in approximately $2.5 billion in damages.105 The floods were followed by an 
upsurge in grassroots relief organizations, but also both local and international criticism of the 
government’s handling of the relief efforts.106  
Bosnia-Herzegovina held its seventh general elections on October 12, 2014, and a cabinet 
was formed approximately six months later. Milorad Dodik was re-elected to the Presidency of 
the Republika Srpska, but his pro-secession party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats 
(SNSD), was weakened at the national level and was not part of the cabinet for the first time 
since 2006. Dragan Čović, leader of the pro-third-entity Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH), 
                                                
104	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina:	May	2014	Monthly	Forecast:	Security	Council	Report.	(2014,	March	1).	Retrieved	April	19,	2016,	
from	http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-05/bosnia_and_herzegovina_3.php.		
105	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina:	November	2014	Monthly	Forecast:	Security	Council	Report.	(2014,	October	30).	Retrieved	April	19,	
2016,	from	http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-11/bosnia_and_herzegovina_4.php.		
106	ibid.		
38 
 
replaced moderate Željko Komšić as the Croat representative to the Presidency. In December 
2014, the EU Foreign Affairs Council, spearheaded by a German-British initiative, in accordance 
with a renewed commitment on the part of BiH’s newly elected leaders, agreed to unlock the 
SAA, and move forward with BiH’s EU membership process.107 This turn-around was partly in 
response to the violent protests the previous year, as well as the floods. While agreements to 
implement reforms were quickly agreed to on paper, little actual progress was attained the 
following year. For instance, BiH’s leaders have refused to update the SAA trade quotas to 
reflect traditional trade with Croatia as part of EU trade, now that Croatia is a member-state. It 
has been reported that the refusal is out of concern that doing so would negatively impact small-
scale farmers.108  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that there is an incompatibility between 
the EU state-building project in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the desires of the country’s ethno-
national leaders. While Bosnia-Herzegovina’s government has made renewed commitments to 
work towards EU membership, resistance to the EU goals remains strong, particularly on the part 
of Bosnian Croat and Serbs nationalists. Ethno-national leaders have used the power-sharing 
mechanisms established in the Dayton Peace Accords, such as the “vital national interest” veto, 
to resist reforms intended to empower the national government, and to retain a weak state. The 
International Community (EU, SB PIC) in BiH has at times used the OHR and the higher courts 
to enforce legal changes, but the direct international involvement has been criticized by ethno-
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national leaders and targeted in their campaigns for reelection. While the citizens of BiH are 
once again primarily concerned with high unemployment and the economy, the country’s ruling 
elites have been more concerned with using their time in the political spotlight, as well as their 
influence over media and wider resources, largely as a way to distract from important matters 
while they further their own agendas. Due to the political and economic stagnancy, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s citizens continue to seek opportunities outside of the country.  
The history of reform efforts indicates that the solutions to the political and economic 
stagnancy in BiH are not as simple as creating institutions. However, it remains to be seen if the 
EU’s approach will be modified. Improvements in other areas of life, including education, must 
occur if Bosnia-Herzegovina’s citizens are to undergo genuine reconciliation, and if they are 
expected to compete in the European market. Though the EU has made education reform a 
prerequisite for membership, and while certain education reform laws have been passed, ethno-
national resistance to the implementation of these laws has enabled education to remain divided 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and most visibly between Bosniaks and Croats in the 
Federation. As will be discussed more in the next chapter, this allows schools in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to become private spaces used for the reproduction of ethno-national identities, 
rather than as forums for cohesion and the interaction of a common citizenry. 
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CHAPTER III: ETHNICALLY-DIVIDED EDUCATION AND RESISTANCE TO 
REINTEGRATION: AN UPDATE ON “TWO SCHOOLS UNDER ONE ROOF” IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I explore ethnically-divided education in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and more 
specifically, ethno-national resistance to reforms targeted at the “two schools under one roof” 
program in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Divided education came to exist in BiH 
following the break-up of Yugoslavia and the war of the 1990s, during which ethno-national 
leaders and their forces directed violence in BiH and effectively suppressed opposition parties 
and the civilian population into bases of support while they secured state enterprises through the 
economic liberalization of the region.  
The Dayton Peace Accords brought an end to the violence in 1995, but also created a 
state with power-sharing structures based on the ethno-national and territorial divisions 
generated during the war. In practice, this means that institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflect 
those divisions, which fails to take into account that identity is not static, and has resulted in a 
fragmented government that has been unable, and perhaps even unwilling, to respond to the 
changing needs of its citizens. In addition, the power-sharing mechanisms have enabled ethno-
national leaders to resist reform efforts and maintain the present arrangements. Resistance to 
reform efforts has enabled ethnically-divided education and the “two schools under one roof” 
program to continue, which further encourages spatial divisions. In this chapter, I argue that 
ethnically-divided education in BiH, and the “two schools under one roof” program in particular, 
allows schools to become private spaces that are used for the reproduction of ethno-national 
identities rather than as forums for cohesion and the interaction of a common citizenry. 
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Background 
Pre-war and Post-war Education 
Before delving into details about the “two-schools under one roof” program, it is 
necessary to provide some information about the pre-war system of education in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This will allow readers to see that although incompatibilities have been 
perpetuated as the norm, they are a development of the war. Insight into the pre-war system of 
education will allow readers to see how education became ethnically-tinged as divisions 
developed, and the ways in which schools became spaces used to dispute or support the post-war 
state.  
Prior to the war, BiH was one of the more heterogeneous parts of Yugoslavia, and this 
extended into classrooms. Valerie Perry notes that the system of education was fairly uniform 
throughout Yugoslavia, and the socialist government used education to raise the literacy rate.109 
Education was also used to promote Yugoslav “brotherhood and unity,” which was the notion 
that the various peoples across the republic could live and intermingle harmoniously. From 1945 
until his death in 1980, Yugoslavia was led by Josip Broz Tito, who considered education an 
important tool for the reconstruction and development of the country in the aftermath of World 
War II.110 Tito’s death was felt throughout Yugoslavia, and afterwards, the country’s leaders 
began to face political and economic instability. 
There were three official languages in the former Yugoslavia: Serbo-Croatian, 
Macedonian, and Slovenian, and nine national minority languages.111 Serbo-Croatian was the 
common language of Yugoslavia, but Macedonian and Slovenian were spoken in those republics. 
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The origins of Serbo-Croatian date back to the nineteenth-century linguist and Serb peasant Vuk 
Stefanović Karadžić. Karadžić, along with Croatian linguist and politician Ljudevit Gaj, saw the 
potential in the union of the Serbo-Croatian language as a “platform for the political unification 
of Serbs-under-Turks and Croats-under-Hungarians.”112 The union of the two “was to serve as a 
cultural weapon in their struggle against the imperial rule of the Ottomans and Hapsburgs.”113  
Furthermore, the union was based on the idea of a common Slavic ethnicity that would 
eventually develop a nation. This message resonated widely in Croatia and Serbia at the time, 
particularly due to resurgent nationalist fervors. The popular masses in both countries adopted 
Karadžić’s linguistic suggestions, and Serbo-Croatian was born. Nonetheless, some regional 
variations were preserved between and within the languages, and used as markers of different 
regions throughout Yugoslavia.114 For instance, Serbian variants used the Cyrillic alphabet, while 
Croatian variants used the Latin alphabet. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbo-Croatian was taught in 
all schools, and both alphabets were also used and taught. 
When Yugoslavia began to dissolve at the beginning of the 1990s, the differences 
between the variants of Serbo-Croatian became emphasized by nationalists in Serbia, Croatia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This led to the removal of the hyphen between the words “Serbo-” and 
“Croatian,” which also symbolized the fading of interconnectedness. Hromadžić notes that 
“linguistic methods” were used to both establish and prove the necessity for the right to 
difference.115 This was part of the ethnic elites’ ideology of cultural fundamentalism, which 
stressed the importance of distinctive cultural identities, as belonging to separate territories. As 
                                                
112	Longinovic,	T.	(2011)	“Serbo-Croatian:	Translating	the	Non-Identical	Twins.”	Translation	and	Opposition,	ed.	Dimitis	
Asimakoulas	(Bristol,	UK:	Multilingual	Matters	Ltd,	2011),	283-295.	Pg.	285.	
113	Ibid.		
114	Hromadžić	2015.	Pg.	47.	
115	ibid.	
43 
 
discussed in the last chapter, following the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethno-national 
differences were formally recognized and institutionalized, which led to more changes in social 
and political relationships among the people. Serbo-Croatian was recognized as three separate 
languages: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, and additional linguistic practices were introduced 
and adopted to create distance between them.  
For instance, Bosniaks and Croats stopped being educated in the Cyrillic alphabet, 
whereas Bosnian Serbs further emphasized the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and the adoption of a 
Serbian dialect, which wasn’t spoken by Bosnian Serbs prior to the war. In the case of Bosniaks, 
politicians and linguists primarily adopted one of two positions. The first position—that only 
Bosnian was spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina—was refuted by the majority of non-Bosniak 
nationalists and linguists. The second position was a strategy to infuse the Bosnian language with 
elements of Turkish—either direct words or certain pronunciations. One example was the 
insertion of the letter “h” at the beginning of many words, that had allegedly “lost” their “h” in 
the course of history, and as the Ottoman empire’s influence in Bosnian culture was 
downplayed.116 The language of Croats, similar to that of Serbs and Serbian, became a symbol of 
Croat nationhood, and use of the language indicated belonging to the Croatian people.  
In addition to changes in linguistic practices, religion in BiH experienced a revival after 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. During the socialist period, the place and role of religion was 
perceived as traditionalistic and incompatible with the progressive thinking of the time by 
Yugoslavia’s Communist leaders.117 On the other hand, the Communist leaders also understood 
the historical and cultural significance of religion, as it related to the national sentiments of the 
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South Slavic peoples. As Yugoslavia dissolved, and as local ethnic elites sought to mobilize the 
emerging nations through discourses of ethnic purity and cultural fundamentalism, religious 
communities were seen as protectors of national heritage and values, and provided institutional 
and symbolic support to their political entrepreneurs. As a result, the mobilizing discourses of the 
elites became further articulated in ethno-religious, rather than democratic-political terms.118 
Religion became politicized and ethnicized, and ethnic and religious identities collapsed into 
each other.  
In other words, religion became a tool for mobilization against “ethnic others.” As R. 
Scott Appleby has noted: “the seeds of Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian religiosity were not 
stamped out under communist rule, even among so-called secularized masses; but neither were 
they nurtured. Scattered and left untended, they were eventually planted in the crude soil of 
ethno-nationalism.”119 Abazovic explains that although the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not 
strictly a religious conflict, shifting perceptions regarding religion’s role in life “made religious 
sites targets of actual and symbolic violence.”120 After the war, religion became an important part 
of social life, which affected the way it was taught in schools. Perry notes that religion classes 
have been taught more as faith formation classes, rather than simply as an academic subject, and 
while religion classes are optional, children may feel pressured by mentors and peers to attend.121 
In addition, in an in depth analysis of textbooks of religious education for primary schools, Aid 
Smajić reports that textbooks of all three major confessions, “be it Catholic, Orthodox or 
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Islamic,” contain some degree of negative portrayals of members of the other two confessions.122 
Furthermore, Valerie Perry notes that as education became fragmented, it led to different 
interpretations of the past:  
In BiH, each of the three constituent peoples has their own preferred interpretations of 
history, with the Bosnian Croat view influenced by Zagreb and the Bosnian Serb view by 
Belgrade. The Bosniak frame of reference is different, as the Bosnian Muslims do not 
have a kin-state. They have therefore been more amenable to new texts, while 
maintaining an interest in the role that the Ottoman empire played in shaping the culture 
of BiH.123 
 
While Bosnian Croats look to Croatia and Bosnian Serbs look to Serbia, it is fair to say that 
present-day Turkey plays a role similar to that of a kin-state for some Bosniaks, as exemplified 
during a 2008 Euro Cup qualifications match between Turkey and Croatia, during which Bosnian 
Croats visibly cheered for Croatia, while Bosniaks instead cheered for Turkey.124 
An example of Turkey’s influence that I encountered during my study in Central Bosnia 
was a scenario in which donated funds had been utilized at a local elementary school for 
renovations to Bosniak classrooms, but not Croat ones. These classrooms were on the first floor, 
and designated for students from a neighboring town because there was not enough space in the 
combined primary-secondary school building in that town. While Bosniak students have gained 
access to this building, their classrooms exist as a separate entity within its walls. In addition, 
these students attend a mid-day shift, whereas local students attend morning and afternoon shifts. 
Though it is true that some of these arrangements are due to a lack of space, it is clear that there 
have been efforts to maintain the separation.  
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Ethnically-divided  
Education 
Ethnically-divided education came to exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the 
ethno-national and territorial divisions of the war, but also because of Annex 7 in the Dayton 
Peace Accords, which provides refugees and displaced persons the right to return to their former 
homes, without undermining their constitutive status.125 Although this initially encouraged 
returnees, the post-war bitterness also fostered the creation of separate spaces and forms of 
education, unwelcoming to the “other.” In addition, returnee numbers were lower than expected, 
which disrupted plans for the eventual reintegration of classrooms and curriculums. Many 
displaced persons did not return due to safety concerns, and many who had settled in wealthier 
countries did not feel a desire to return to the insecurity in BiH.126 Those who did return to their 
former homes confronted various circumstances, including changes to local governmental 
structures and educational institutions.127 
As a result, education is highly decentralized in Bosnia-Herzegovina and there are 14 
ministries of education: two entity ministries, ten cantonal ministries, a separate administration 
for education in the District of Brčko, and a ministry at the state level, which acts as a loose 
coordinating mechanism. Conversely, in the Republika Srpska, education is highly centralized, 
due to the Serb majority. As a result, education in this entity follows a Serb curriculum, and has 
been less contested. Meanwhile, governments in each canton in the Federation are obliged to 
transfer control of education to municipalities in areas where the majority population of a 
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municipality differs from the majority population of the entire canton.128 Similar to the 
Republika Srpska, education is not contested in ethnically homogenous parts of the Federation, 
but in areas where control has been transferred to municipalities, ethnically homogenous schools 
are able to embrace a mono-ethnic curriculum.129 In the separate curriculums, Croat schools use 
textbooks that are developed in Croatia, Serbs use textbooks from Serbia, and Bosniaks use 
textbooks developed in BiH. 
In addition to separate curriculums, referred to as programs, Gordana Božić lists three 
types of ethnically-divided education that exist in post-war BiH: “(1) “two schools under one 
roof,” (2) busing children to monoethnic schools, (3) and the teaching of so-called national 
subjects.”130 According to Valerie Perry, the national subjects are history, language (mother 
tongue) geography, art, literature, and music.131 In more recent discussions, primarily history, 
language, and geography have been listed as the national subjects most contested. The idea of the 
national subjects was created by the OHR, and intended to facilitate the reintegration of non-
national subjects, but it instead increased tensions.132 In addition, when the OHR introduced the 
idea of reintegrating certain classes, but not the national subjects, it failed to fully consider that 
all lessons are taught in national languages.133 This has allowed individual subjects, even those 
such as chemistry, physics, and mathematics, to be used for the “protection” of national identity. 
The national subjects are taught primarily in the Republika Srpska, in areas with significant 
numbers of Bosniak returnees. Bosniak students study the Serb curriculum in classrooms with 
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Bosnian Serb students, but are then separated for the national subjects. The national subjects are 
also taught in the Federation, but in this case they are used primarily for Serb returnees.  
In response to slow reconstruction in the aftermath of the war, “two schools under one 
roof” emerged in the FBiH as a temporary solution advocated by the U.S. and the EU.134 It 
enabled the shared use of resources by Bosniaks and Croats in the mixed areas of the Federation, 
but it did not facilitate the shared use of classrooms or curriculums. In 2002, the OSCE, initially 
tasked with monitoring elections in BiH, began to focus state-level education reforms. Reform 
efforts comprised three areas: technical, curricular, and legislative.135 In 2003, the OSCE 
reported that there were fifty-seven “two schools under one roof,” located predominantly in three 
cantons: Central Bosnia, Herzegovina Neretva, and Zenica–Doboj.136 Though the number of 
these schools seems small, they have posed a significant challenge to those working toward 
unified education.  
 
Education Reform Efforts 
One important event regarding education reform in BiH occurred in 2005, when the High 
Representative at the time, Paddy Ashdown, removed Nikola Lovrinović from his position as the 
Minister of Education in the Central Bosnia Canton for failure to adopt the Applicable Laws, 
which unified the legal and administrative aspects of “two schools under one roof.” The official 
document states that education reform is necessary for ensuring sustainable peace and realizing 
BiH’s hopes of joining the European Union, and Mr. Lovrinović obstructed this process by 
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refusing to implement the legislation in schools in his jurisdiction.137 The document also notes 
that the Croat delegates in the Assembly of the Central Bosnia canton had invoked the “vital 
national interest” veto, regarding the laws, but the Constitutional Court of the Federation of BiH, 
did not find that the laws undermined Croats’ constitutive status. Afterwards, Mr. Lovrinović 
issued a “Standpoint on authentic interpretation,” which he described as a request for further 
clarification regarding certain provisions in the Applicable Laws.138 The OHR interpreted the 
standpoint as a refusal to cooperate, and his removal was announced several days later. In an 
interview with the “Vecernji List” Foreign Press Office in Mostar, Mr. Lovrinović had the 
following to say: 
Lovrinović: This removal was unexpected only in terms of how it was carried out. 
Namely, only a few days earlier I sent a letter to OHR requesting more detailed 
interpretation of some parts of the Law on Primary and Secondary Education 
imposed upon us last year. As the minister who is responsible for implementing 
that law, I have a right to such a request. But, instead of an answer and 
clarification, I received a notice of removal. 
 
VL: Which articles are you specifically concerned about and what is unclear in 
them? 
 
Lovrinović: I am talking about those articles that define the curricular language, 
cases of “two schools under one roof” and registration areas. Especially unclear is 
how this imposed law attempts to resolve cases of “two schools under one roof.” I 
don’t know if that also applies to cases where in one building you have a primary 
school and a secondary school, private and public school or schools that follow all 
European standards and can exist as independent legal entities. 
 
VL: Can you give us an example? 
Lovrinović: The primary school in Vitez. There is one school that employs a 
Croatian plan and program and has 1000 students, and another Bosniak school 
with 700 students. European standards consider 600 to be an optimal number of 
students in a school. In this case, both schools have enough students and teachers 
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to work as two independent schools. To combine them would mean violating 
European standards and rules not encompassed by last year’s imposed Law on 
Primary and Secondary Education. Moreover, that would violate the wishes of 
parents who want a curriculum in their mother tongue. 
 
Mr. Lovrinović went on to say that he did not believe he was an obstacle to the rule of law in the 
Central Bosnia Canton. In addition, he said it would make him happy if someone could tell him 
where else in BiH could the constituent peoples exercise their right to schooling in their “mother 
tongue?” What of the rights of Croats in Sarajevo, or of Croats and Bosniaks in the Republika 
Srpska? These questions are nearly-identical to ones I received, albeit rhetorically, from Croat 
participants during my study.139 An Evaluation Report, commissioned by the OSCE in 2006, 
stated: “In this two-under-one system, everything is duplicated, e.g. there are two directors, two 
teachers’ councils, two student councils, two curricula and separate textbooks in the national 
languages, etc.”140 In 2007, the Minister of Education who replaced Nikola Lovrinović in the 
Central Bosnia Canton, Greta Kuna, a member of the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ BiH), said:  
“There are two schools, and two school curriculums. One curriculum is taught in the 
basement, and the other is taught on the first floor. I think that the fact that there are two 
schools under one roof is not problematic at all. It is a sort of unification, a reduction of 
costs. You know, pears and apples should not join together; pears should be with pears; 
apples with apples.”141 
 
These words were interpreted differently by Bosniaks and Croats in the Central Bosnia Canton, 
but controversial to the public in any case. Those who favored unification, primarily Bosniaks, 
argued the minister had spoken of dividing children as if they were pears and apples, whereas 
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51 
 
those who favored separation, primarily Croats, argued the comparison was a reference to the 
curriculums, and not to the students.142 Still, it is possible to see that Croat leaders in the Central 
Bosnia Canton, which has the highest number of schools that operate the “two schools under one 
roof” program, have been resistant to reforms. 
Nevertheless, some reforms were achieved during this time, including the administrative 
reunifications of the Mostar Gymnasium (a well-known high school), and schools in the Zenica-
Doboj Canton.143 A Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education was passed in 2003, 
which standardized primary and secondary school requirements and mandated a core 
curriculum.144 However, a core curriculum was not actually designed and implemented, but 
rather, similarities in all three curriculums were identified and labeled as the core curriculum. 
The OSCE also produced educational materials for students and officials, including schoolbooks 
and instruction manuals, as a way to supplement the mono-ethnic curriculums. Hromadžić states, 
however, that formal reunification efforts subsided after the Mostar Gymnasium success in 2005, 
primarily because the OSCE did not want to further exacerbate Croat-Bosniak tensions.145  
In 2010 The Parliament of the FBiH adopted a resolution which established multiethnic 
administrative systems, but most saw changes as unlikely. Only a few schools complied with the 
mandate. In more recent years, the OSCE has focused on “field-level, apolitical projects…in the 
absence of political will for the implementation of systemic reforms.”146 Still, the “two schools 
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under one roof” program reinforces separate identities rather than a united citizenry, and 
resistance to reintegration and reform efforts further realizes the wartime divisions.  
It bears mentioning that the District of Brčko, located in the northeast part of BiH can be 
considered to have an integrated system of education. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
District of Brčko is a self-governing region, with its own leader, known as the Brčko District 
Supervisor. The office of BD Supervisor was established in 1997, after which the region was 
demilitarized, and economically and socially developed.147 Perry reports that the BD Supervisor 
began to work on education reform for the region in 1999, and after a couple of years of 
resistance on the part of Bosnian Serbs and local politicians, the BD Supervisor enforced a single 
Law on Education and standardized the curriculum.148 Integration began with first year students, 
and was successfully expanded and completed over the next four years. It was not an entirely 
smooth process, but Perry elaborates that the Law on Education imposed four principles:  
1. Freedom of pupils to express themselves on their own language. 2. Issuance of school 
documents in the language and alphabet as requested by a pupil. 3. Appropriate ethnic 
composition of teachers for the instruction of national group subjects. 4. Use of existing 
textbooks in line with harmonized curriculum.149  
 
Both Cyrillic and Latin alphabets are taught in Brčko schools, and a weekly rotation between the 
two takes place. Finally, national subjects are taught in ethnically-divided classrooms, while 
other subjects are taught in mixed classrooms. While Perry does not think that this model is 
transferrable to other parts of BiH, largely due to the political circumstances, it may offer insight 
for further curriculum harmonization efforts throughout the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Things to  
Consider 
Most of the literature on education in Bosnia-Herzegovina calls for systemic reform and 
European standardization, but it does not necessarily provide insight into students’ views on the 
importance of secondary education in the current political and economic climate the country 
faces. Azra Hromadžić spent a year observing classroom interactions at the Mostar Gymnasium 
and became familiar with the savviness the students exhibited when it came to cheating on 
exams.150 She reports that students used traditional methods such as small scraps of paper that 
they would prepare during breaks, but they also adopted more sophisticated methods through the 
use of technology and “bugs.” Hromadžić’s participants report that teachers made them 
memorize useless information, and held them accountable for knowing this material in oral 
examinations. Her participants explained to her that they didn’t think they were being immoral 
by cheating, they were being rational considering the rampant corruption in the public sector, 
education included. They detailed how some of their classmates’ parents had connections and 
simply purchased diplomas for their children, which enabled them to get into prestigious colleges 
outside of BiH, while other students struggled to pass complicated and information-laden exams. 
Hromadžić writes that while cheating was present in the pre-war system, today’s situation 
differs slightly. In the socialist system, students would be in the same class from the start of their 
education, until they finished secondary school. They spent many years learning together, and 
cheating in these instances served to enhance solidarity among the students, whereas in the 
present situation, the neoliberal context places more emphasis on the individual, and so students 
use cheating as a means to get ahead and create opportunities for themselves. In prior times, 
                                                
150	Cheating	Citizens	and	Their	Democratic	Predicament	in	Postwar	and	Postsocialist	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	Azra	Hromadžić.	
Forthcoming	publication.	
54 
 
cheating served to elevate the status of the entire class; students helped one of their own so they 
would all progress. Meanwhile, today’s students use cheating as a means to make it through to 
graduation, so that they can go and live better lives in better circumstances. Hromadžić states 
that the students are quite aware of the precarity of the Bosnian situation, and they understand 
that the current system is not preparing them to take charge.  
In her research, Hromadžić explored mixing between students in the Mostar Gymnasium 
and reports on the use of informal spaces for inter-ethnic mixing.151 She describes spending time 
with mixed groups of students, who interact by smoking cigarettes together in the bathroom 
during breaks, and drinking coffee before and after school. In the account Hromadžić provides, it 
is evident that students find ways to interact, but this does not mean that reform is not needed. 
Meanwhile, Komatsu notes that school directors in Bosnia-Herzegovina can act as 
facilitators between members of the school board and the community at large. They can 
encourage dialogue and consultation between participants rather than simply mediate their 
differences.152 He indicates that the level of independence that school directors may feel that they 
have represents the pre-war system, which influences how they perceive the school board—they 
may see it as merely a “council of teachers”—while they are the true professionals.153 Komatsu 
concludes that it would be advantageous to offer further training to school directors, so that they 
can, in turn, offer training to school board members. He notes that school directors can deepen 
their understanding of shared school governance and social cohesion if they were primarily 
responsible for training the school board members in doing so as well. Still, it is important not to 
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overestimate the level of agency that school directors have in the local context. They must also 
tread cautiously, to avoid being seen as political pawns. 
 
Recent Developments 
In 2011, an NGO known as Vaša Prava, (Your Rights) filed lawsuits against the 
educational ministries in the Herzegovina Neretva and Central Bosnia Cantons, claiming that 
there were discriminatory policies in place due to the division of students along ethnic lines 
through the “two schools under one roof” program. The Mostar Municipal Court in the 
Herzegovina Neretva Canton ruled in favor of Vaša Prava, and stated: “the policy of division can 
only enhance prejudice and intolerance towards others, and lead to further ethnic isolation.”154 
The verdict was appealed by the Court of the Herzegovina Neretva Canton, which overturned the 
ruling, claiming that the statute of limitations had expired in the case. In addition to the case 
being overturned in the Herzegovina Neretva Cantonal Court, the Court of Travnik in the Central 
Bosnia Canton also overturned the decision.155 
However, in October 2014, the Supreme Court in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
ruled that the statue of limitations had not expired, and upheld the Mostar Municipal Court’s 
decision. The Supreme Court found that “organizing school systems based on ethnic background 
and implementing curriculums on ethnic principles” was discriminatory.156  
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This ruling was welcomed by Vaša Prava, as well as the Federation’s Minister of 
Education and Science, Damir Mašić, who said: 
“The verdict’s aim is that the Federation, after more than a decade of divisions and the 
separation of children, will have a chance to reinstate a system which has existed for 
centuries, which is for children to live with one another and spend time together.” 
 
He explained, however, that the responsibility to end the practice of dividing students lies with 
the authorities in the ten cantons that make up the Federation, and not with the Federation 
officials. On the other hand, Federation officials can advocate and assist cantonal ministries in 
ending the practice. 
In December 2015, Radio Free Europe featured a report on “two schools under one roof” 
in the Central Bosnian city of Vitez, which contained a brief remark from the current Minister of 
Education for the Central Bosnia Canton, Katica Čerkez, in which she reiterated that Bosnia-
Herzegovina is a country with three constitutive peoples, three official languages, and that the 
system of education is a reflection of the legal framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so the 
interests of both children and their parents are satisfied, and so children are able to obtain an 
education in the program they and their parents prefer. She repeats that, this is a result of the 
legal framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which generated the current system.157 After the 
Minister is shown, a local father who recalls a system without separation says children are 
divided at the age of seven until they are adults, so how can they hope for some sort of unity, 
when all they know is division? Still, another parent says that the school situation does not have 
an effect on who their child forms friendships with, and with whom the child has contact. The 
report concludes by showing ethno-national graffiti on the school’s exterior. 
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In March 2016, Minister Čerkez stated that discriminations stemming from the “two 
schools under one roof” program do not exist in the Central Bosnia Canton.158 While it may be 
possible to say that there is a harmonious overlap of students notwithstanding the structural 
divisions, and that students may end up in mixed classrooms depending on availability of 
resources and study plan particularities, the minister’s statement is once again settled within the 
Dayton framework, and in protecting Croat autonomy. Still, the minister does say that education 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not on par with international standards, but that this is an inherited 
problem and progress is slow, “especially in Bosnia.”  
 
Conclusion 
As discussed in this chapter, the “two schools under one roof” program and ethnically-
divided education came to exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and the 1990s war. Ethno-national and religious sentiments replaced the Yugoslav 
notions of brotherhood and unity, which were emphasized during the socialist period. I have 
attempted to provide a brief overview of this transition in order to demonstrate that although 
ethnic divisions have been perpetuated as the norm, they are a relatively recent development. 
While the international community works to implement changes from above, research indicates 
that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to ethnic divisions in education in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The change in approach by the OSCE for instance, from direct involvement in 
reform efforts to a more a-political strategy, is worth noting. 
Although Bosnia-Herzegovina’s leaders have made renewed commitments to work 
towards EU membership, whether they can agree to implement the necessary reforms remains to 
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be seen. As demonstrated in this chapter, resistance to reform and reintegration efforts has 
enabled ethnically-divided education and the “two schools under one roof” program to continue. 
This allows schools to become private spaces that are used for the reproduction of ethno-national 
identities rather than as forums for cohesion and the interaction of a common citizenry. In the 
next chapter, I explore the attitudes that Bosniaks and Croats in a mixed semi-rural town in the 
Central Bosnia Canton have towards the 2014 Supreme Court ruling, which found the “two 
schools under one roof” program unconstitutional, and provide an update on reform efforts in the 
country.  
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CHAPTER IV: RESPONSE TO THE 2014 SUPREME COURT RULING IN THE CENTRAL 
BOSNIA CANTON 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I explore the attitudes that Bosniaks and Croats in a semi-rural town in the 
Central Bosnia Canton have towards the 2014 Supreme Court ruling in the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as well as education in BiH in general.159 I provide a brief overview of my 
interactions with four individuals with ties to local schools, as well as with members of the 
general adult population. In addition, I provide a snapshot of the circumstances that students in 
this area face upon graduating from a system of ethnically-divided education. In doing so, I 
argue that the ethnically-divided system of education does not necessarily reflect the attitudes of 
the general population, and that there is a disconnect between the desires of ethno-national 
leaders and the concerns of citizens.  
Although I was able to learn shortly after my arrival to the Central Bosnia Canton that no 
changes to the upcoming school year had been proposed by the Ministry of Education to in 
response to the 2014 Supreme Court ruling that found the practice of the “two schools under one 
roof” program discriminatory and unconstitutional, I still found it worthwhile to engage in 
discussions with participants about the court ruling and ethnically-divided education, due to the 
government’s renewed commitments to work towards European integration. As part of this 
commitment, BiH’s leaders have pledged to ensure that “access to all levels of education and 
training is free of any discrimination on the grounds of gender, color, ethnic origin or 
religion.”160 The division of children across ethnic lines, and particularly the existence of the 
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“two schools under one roof” program has been a consistent topic in meetings between EU and 
BiH authorities.161  
This chapter also includes background information concerning the events of the war that 
took place in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, intended to show that the wartime divisions 
influence the attitudes of politicians and citizens in matters of reform and reintegration efforts. It 
can be said that the conflict in Central Bosnia differed slightly from the generally perceived 
conflict that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so discussions regarding reform and reintegration 
efforts may also differ.  
 
Background 
In order to understand the attitudes that Bosniaks and Croats in the Central Bosnia 
Canton have towards the 2014 Supreme Court ruling, and education in BiH in general, it is 
necessary to provide some background information about the fighting that took place between 
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina–ABiH and the Croatian Defence Council–
HVO in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will help to define the divisions between Bosniaks 
and Croats as they exist in this area today, and perhaps enable readers to see why Croats have 
been more reluctant to work towards an integrated and centralized state. Although Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s leaders have made further commitments to work towards EU membership, the 
events of the war remain in the recent past for many, which plays a part in whether reform efforts 
are adopted and implemented by local populations. At the same time, some background 
information about the war will help to provide insight into participants’ responses to this study. 
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Charles Shrader writes that the civil war between the ABiH and the HVO in Central 
Bosnia was a war of logistics. The two factions fought for control of military industrial facilities 
in the region, as well as for control of lines of communication.162 Lines of communication 
included important roads linking ethnic enclaves together, as well as connections to the outside 
world. Shrader states that the ABiH wished to take the Lašva Valley so that Bosniak refugees 
from other parts of BiH could be settled there. The town of Busovaca, located in the Lašva 
Valley, was a political center for Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia, and if the Croats from this 
area were expelled, then Bosniaks would have political control of the municipality. 
In Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered the industrial sector. There were 
numerous production facilities located throughout the country. The majority were focused in the 
Lašva  Valley in Central Bosnia, and some more were scattered along the borders of this 
region.163 North and south of the Lašva Valley were a series of military factories, which were all 
built and managed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). As Yugoslavia collapsed, the 
majority of the factories fell into the hands of the ABiH. These factories were located in Zenica, 
Konjic, Bugojno, Travnik, and Novi Travnik. However, the most important of these factories, 
The Slobodan Princip Seljo (SPS) factory, located in Vitez, remained in the control of the HVO 
throughout the conflict. The SPS factory was the only one of its kind in the Balkans, and was 
responsible for manufacturing military explosives necessary for the production of mortar and 
artillery shells. The factory was located west of Vitez, and it was the key to the chain of military 
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production facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without it, the other facilities were not able to fully 
function. Below is a photo of the ethnic composition of BiH after 1993.164 
 
 
Figure 1. Croats (black) and Bosniaks (Gray) in BiH during 1993.White areas are Serb-
controlled. The Lašva Valley lies in the area between Vitez and Kiseljak. (Source: Croatia.org) 
 
Shrader notes that the fighting in the Lašva Valley was not the main conflict in BiH from 
1992-1995, but it is an important one because such fierce fighting occurred in a small space and 
among close neighbors. Studying this conflict enables us to look at how wars are conducted in 
more modern and developed settings, as many skirmishes included fighting within towns and 
villages, in addition to the surrounding areas. When the Yugoslav/Serb forces attacked Croatia, 
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Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks began to get organized in case war broke out in Bosnia as well. 
The Bosnian Croats formed the Croatian Defence Council, first the civilian element on April 8, 
1992, then the military element on May 15, 1992. Meanwhile, the majority of the former 
Yugoslav Territorial Defense forces and their resources were absorbed into the Army of the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
In Central Bosnia, Shrader states that the ABiH launched their initial attacks in January 
1993, aiming to cut the Croat enclave in the Lašva Valley into several pockets, culminating in 
their forced surrender and exodus from the region. The attacks in January were designed to test 
the response of the Croat defenders, and they essentially worked, catching the Croats off guard in 
the northern parts of the Lašva Valley, as well as generally throughout. The HVO was able to 
prevent any major advancements during January, although their defense lines were only partially 
staffed and stretched thin. There were several incidents, such as kidnappings of prominent HVO 
officials by mujahideen soldiers, as well as small-scale exchanges of fire, which provoked 
tensions among the Bosniaks and Croats in Central Bosnia during the early months of 1993.  
A cease-fire was established after the January attacks, but it was not closely followed by 
ABiH forces, something the HVO reported in the weeks leading up to the renewed ABiH 
offensive on April 15, 1993. The next day, the HVO forces launched a counterattack in the 
village of Ahmići and in other nearby areas, aimed at preventing the ABiH troops from 
regrouping. Shrader notes that the military aspect of the counterattack was successful, but the 
ensuing massacre of Bosniak civilians, as well as the destruction of the village, was an 
“unintended consequence” of the counterattack.165 Though his assessment is based on an analysis 
of the available communication records, as well as personal experience in the region during and 
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after the war, it is difficult to truly know what led to the events that transpired on that day. 
Several Bosnian Croat leaders were convicted of war crimes because of this incident, and it is the 
most cited of the events of the Muslim-Croat conflict in Central Bosnia.166 Another cease-fire 
was signed between the ABiH and the HVO in late April, and the two sides reassessed their 
positions. 
Following the implementation of the cease-fire, the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak leaders 
agreed to follow human rights protocols, including care for the wounded, protection of civilians, 
and provisions for the exchange of prisoners. Colonel Blaskic issued a series of orders to his 
subordinates during the last weeks of April, urging them to follow the cease-fire agreement, but 
also to be on their guard.167 Due to the reports he was receiving from eyewitnesses, he believed 
the Bosniaks were not serious about following the cease-fire, so he communicated with the UN 
and EC leaders in Central Bosnia, urging them to intervene in the matter.168 
Fighting broke out again during the first week of June, 1993, when the ABiH forces 
attacked the HVO in the town of Travnik, located in the northern part of the Lašva Valley, and 
forced them in the direction of the Serb forces, who took them prisoner. Similar, intense, small-
scale conflicts continued to take place even as peace agreements developed. The Kula sector east 
of Busovaca fell to the ABiH during the month of June, as did other villages bordering the Lašva 
Valley. In August, 1993, Colonel Blaskic reported that the HVO situation was becoming critical. 
He issued an order calling for severe disciplinary measures to be taken against soldiers deserting 
their positions. The ABiH leaders met in Zenica in late August and discussed their plans for the 
continued offensive against the Croats in Central Bosnia. There was also some restructuring in 
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the ABiH command, which led to more conservative individuals assuming control over the 
Bosniak forces surrounding the Croats in Central Bosnia.169 
The fighting continued during September, resembling trench-warfare, and calmed down 
during the month of October.170 In November, it erupted again, and this time, the SPS factory 
came under direct fire by the ABiH forces. In Vitez, fighting was intense during the fall of 1993, 
and the ABiH forces attempted to break the Croat pocket in two. They came close to doing so in 
early January, 1994, but they did not fully succeed. The HVO launched a series of counterattacks 
in the areas that were lost during the fall, and they regained some of the lost ground in late 
January.171 However, fighting between Bosniaks and Croats tapered off as the Washington 
Agreement was introduced in February 1994, and preparations were made for its signing. A 
cease-fire in accordance with the agreement was signed on February 23 in Zagreb, and 
implemented on February 25.172 When the Washington Agreement was signed, the Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was established, and the Muslim-Croat alliance was restored. This was the 
end of the open conflict between the two, and eventually the HVO was absorbed into the ABiH 
after the war ended. 
As can be seen, the fighting in this area was especially heated from 1993-94, which, in 
addition to the continued political and economic problems, adds to the difficulty for those 
working towards reconciliation, reform, and reintegration. As discussed in earlier chapters, Croat 
nationalists have repeatedly argued for a third entity, and used the “vital national interest” veto to 
block reforms from implementation. Furthermore, the election of self-declared Bosnian Croat 
and member of the predominantly Bosniak-supported Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH) Željko 
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Komšić (rather than a nationalist) as the Croat representative to the Presidency in 2006, and his 
re-election in 2010, further upset Croats and caused them to stop cooperating on matters of 
reform. Croat nationalists argued that because Komšić was elected primarily by Bosniak votes, 
he was not a rightful representative, and their constitutive status was being undermined. 
 
Ethnographic Study 
On May 25, 2015, I flew to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and spent the next six weeks 
in a mixed, semi-rural town in the Central Bosnia Canton, gauging the response to the 2014 
Supreme Court ruling in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that found the “two schools 
under one roof” program unconstitutional, and ordered an end to its practice. It took me 
approximately two weeks after arriving to formulate an approach to interviews, and to begin 
meeting with individuals. During this time, I visited with family and friends who reside in the 
Central Bosnia area, and obtained their advice on possible candidates for potential interviews. 
For the first two weeks, I stayed at my uncle’s house, and I made an effort to help out with 
chores here and there while I established a daily routine, and adjusted to the area. While I had 
visited BiH several times after moving to the United States, I had never attempted to carry out a 
study, and this time around, my focus was not just personal. Because of this, I had to establish a 
way to keep my study-related interactions separate from my familial and social interactions, 
which also took a bit of planning. 
After the first two weeks, I moved into an apartment in town, which belongs to a relative 
of mine who lives in Austria, and lived there by myself for the next month. I was fortunate to 
have the space and the resources to conduct additional research, as well as the solitude to reflect 
on the events of the day. After moving into the apartment, I read that the local primary school 
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planned to have a day where students and parents could come and buy/sell/exchange their 
schoolbooks, and I saw this as an opportunity to see if I could meet potential study participants 
with ties to the school.   
 
Primary school visit 
I walked to the school on the day of the sale, and saw that there was a small crowd of 
students in front of the building, gathered around a table with books on top of it. As I 
approached, I saw that there was an older student standing by the front doors, monitoring the 
gathering. I greeted this student and asked if the director was in, to which he replied that he was, 
and that he was possibly on the second floor. There was a teacher just inside the school who 
overheard us talking and she confirmed that the director was upstairs and offered to take me to 
him.  
The teacher led me up to the second floor and the director was there, speaking with 
another teacher by the look of it, but he concluded shortly after we reached the landing. I 
introduced myself to the director, who looked not much older than me, and shared with him that 
I was from this area, but that I now lived in the United States, and attended school there. I 
explained the details of my study, making note of the literature I had read, as well as the news of 
the 2014 Supreme Court case, and asked if he might be able to tell me if he had heard about the 
court case. The director said he had heard about the initial Municipal Court case, and the 
subsequent case that overturned the ruling, but he did not mention the Supreme Court case. At 
this time, I had already been in the area for a few weeks, and it was somewhat apparent to me 
that the Central Bosnia Ministry of Education had not proposed any changes to the local schools 
to reflect the Supreme Court ruling so I did not ask the director if he was perhaps unaware of the 
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most recent court case.173 Instead, I asked if he might be willing to give me a brief tour of the 
building. As I described in the last chapter, this building operated the “two schools under one 
roof” program, and the Bosniak classrooms, located on the first floor, had been renovated 
through the use of funds from Turkey. Below is a photo of the exterior of the school.  
 
 
Figure 2. Primary school in the Central Bosnia Canton. Gymnasium attached. Author’s Photo. 
 
As can be seen in the photo, graffiti had been painted over in mismatched colors, leaving 
the underlying marks discernable from up-close.174 Shortly before my arrival to BiH, I read a 
brief report that the school had been broken into, which was confirmed to me by a relative, who 
suggested that I should have somebody arrange an introduction with the director in order to 
                                                
173	It	is	interesting	that	the	director	did	not	acknowledge	the	Supreme	Court	case,	because	neither	did	the	Croat	Minister	of	
Education	for	the	Central	Bosnia	Canton	in	an	interview	she	gave	to	a	local	news	program	earlier	this	year	(see	previous	
chapter).	Minister	Čerkez	also	specifically	recalled	the	Municipal	Court	case,	and	the	Cantonal	Court	case	which	overturned	it,	
and	then	indicated	the	matter	was	resolved.	This	indicates	that	Croats	in	the	Central	Bosnia	Canton	may	not	necessarily	
recognize	the	authority	of	the	courts	in	Sarajevo,	but	instead	look	to	the	courts	in	the	“Croat	capital	of	BiH,”	Mostar.	It	remains	
to	be	seen	if	the	Supreme	Court	ruling	will	have	any	effect	on	the	way	education	is	carried	out	in	the	FBiH.	
174	The	underlying	marks	refer	to	a	local	Croat	wartime	leader.		
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avoid appearing suspicious. In any case, I did not ask the director about this incident, as I felt it 
would be rude of me to inquire as an outsider. The director showed me several of the Croat 
classrooms, and we then walked back downstairs.  
During the descent, I assumed he was going to show me the classrooms on the first floor 
as well, but he did not lead me into the hallway where these classrooms were. Instead, he pointed 
out that a part of the interior had been freshly painted, and there were plans to paint the rest now 
that the school year was over. Our conversation subsided after this, and I did not want to 
overstay my welcome since this meeting was not scheduled so I did not inquire as to whether he 
could show me the Bosniak classrooms, but I later learned that the renovated Bosniak classrooms 
are an extension of the combined primary/secondary school in the neighboring town, which I 
visited and describe later in this chapter. The director of the school in the neighboring town is 
technically the director of the Bosniak classrooms. In addition, the students from the neighboring 
town attend a mid-day shift, while local students attended morning and afternoon shifts. Though 
it may be true that some of these accommodations are due to a lack of space, it is also clear that 
there have been efforts to maintain divisions. Afterwards, I thanked the director for speaking 
with me, as well as the teacher who led me to him, and then I left the school.  
I was pleased that the director had spoken with me, but in some ways I imagine it was 
strange for him to have a Croat with ties to the area inquire about the ongoing state of reforms in 
education. I mentioned to the director that I attended first grade in BiH, but undoubtedly, my 
research questions came from an American academic’s perspective. One of the reasons why I 
chose to conduct this study in this area was because much of the literature I came across did not 
describe the Central Bosnia Canton in great detail so I was curious as to what perceptions were 
in this area, regarding both the recent Supreme Court ruling and the system of education. In some 
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ways, my desire was to supplement the available literature on education in BiH with a snapshot 
of the current events in Central Bosnia. It was my hope that I could use my identity to my 
advantage in discussions with Croat participants, but it has been nearly twenty years since I 
moved to the United States, and in many ways I have become an outsider. The following section 
provides an example of a less successful interaction with a Croat participant.  
 
Secondary school visit 
After meeting with the Croat director of the primary school, I spent the next couple of 
days debating how I could arrange a meeting with the Croat director of the local secondary 
school. I had a relative who worked in the school, but because the school year had ended, I was 
told the director was only at the school for a couple of hours each morning, finishing up 
paperwork before he departed for vacation. My relative offered to introduce me to the director, 
and she suggested that I show up at the school at around eight in the morning, before she began 
her shift. I went to the school and entered through the main set of doors. This building also had 
two schools under one roof; the Croat students attended a morning shift while the Bosniak 
students attended an afternoon shift. They had separate curriculums, directors, administrations, 
and teachers. My relative had worked there for more than a decade, and informed me that the 
Bosniak students had returned to the school around 2004-05, after the “two schools under one 
roof” program was enacted. While we waited for the director to arrive, I sat with her in the staff 
locker room/break area. It was a small room, really only big enough for a few people at most, so 
as more of the staff arrived, chairs quickly filled up. Several of the individuals smoked cigarettes 
in preparation for their shift, and although the smoke filtered out of the room, it was stifling and I 
began to wonder when the director would arrive. 
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Around eight thirty, the director entered the school, and as he passed by the custodial 
locker room on the way to the stairs, my relative called out to him and arranged an introduction. 
This director was slightly older than the director of the primary school, but from the look of it, 
both men were somewhere in their thirties. Contrary to the primary school director, this director 
was less willing to speak with me, and after I introduced myself and explained the nature of my 
study, once again making note of the court case and the literature, the only response that I 
received was that what I had read about the “two schools under one roof” program was a “tinted” 
version of the story. He did not explain what he meant, but based on my analysis, his reply 
indicates that he did not see the ethnic-divisions in education as the “segregation” of students, 
which is how it has been framed in much of the literature. 
Perhaps this was because, as many of the Croat participants with whom I spoke 
mentioned, despite the formal divisions, Bosniak students in the Central Bosnia Canton often 
attended Croat schools or enrolled in Croat curriculums in order to study the Croatian language. 
As my participants explained, this was in order to demonstrate proficiency on college entrance 
exams, or find employment in Croatia.175 Perhaps this influenced his reaction. Still, it is 
necessary to consider that Bosniak students in Central Bosnia maybe did this out of necessity, 
and not out of a desire to be among Croat students; in some cases, Croat schools in are better 
equipped or staffed because they were once shared schools in the pre-war system, while the 
Bosniak schools may have been erected in the aftermath of the war, and may not have the same 
level of recognition outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.176 One example of this is the Petar Barbarić 
                                                
175	My	relative	who	had	worked	in	the	school	staff	for	over	a	decade	mentioned	that	while	Bosniak	students	frequently	enrolled	
the	Croat	curriculum,	in	her	time	at	the	school,	only	one	Croat	student	had	signed	up	for	the	Federal/Bosniak	curriculum,	and	
this	was	because	his	mother	enrolled	him	as	punishment	for	not	performing	well	in	the	Croat	curriculum.	She	said	that	this	
student	was	isolated	initially,	but	eventually	made	some	acquaintances.		
176	Hromadžić	(2015)	describes	instances	of	this	in	her	work	on	the	administrative	reunification	of	the	Mostar	Gymnasium.			
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Catholic School Center in Travnik, located in NW Central Bosnia. This school exists in one half 
of a singular building. The Croat Catholic school part of the building has been renovated, while 
the Bosnian state school side of the school has not. I was told by one Croat participant that some 
of the teachers who teach in the Croat school also taught in the pre-war system, while the 
Bosniak school teachers are less experienced. This school, like most of the Catholic schools in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was built by the Austro-Hungarian empire, and bears recognition outside of 
BiH. Today in BiH, there are six Catholic school centers, and they are open to students of any 
religion.177 Approximately 15% of the students are non-Catholics.178 Below is a picture of the 
divided school building in Travnik.  
 
Figure 3. Petar Barbarić Catholic School Center in Travnik. Source: Radiosarajevo.ba 
 
 
                                                
177	Čuvalo,	A.	(2010).	The	A	to	Z	of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina.	Lanham,	MD:	Scarecrow	Press.	Pg.	76.	
178	ibid.		
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The Croat director asked if I had obtained permission from the Ministry of Education in 
the Central Bosnia Canton to meet with him, to which I replied that I had not. He then said that 
we could not speak further, wished me a good day, and walked out of the school. I was caught 
off guard a bit, because I did not expect such a sudden reaction, and I felt like I had offended the 
director, causing him to leave the building. My relative informed me that his demeanor was 
usually like this, but I felt that I needed to apologize to the director because my intent that 
morning was simply to introduce myself, and to see if he might be willing to speak with me, not 
to disturb his business. 
I spoke with the staff for another ten minutes or so, until the director came back to the 
school. I had a chance to tell him that I did not mean to upset his mood, to which he replied that I 
had not done so, but since I did not have permission from the Ministry to meet with him, my 
time would be better spent among the general population, perhaps in cafes. I thanked him for his 
time, and our interaction ended.  
While it was evident to me that the director had to guard his position and remain unbiased 
in the public eye, the way I introduced myself and presented my study was not designed to 
elucidate his personal opinion on the matter of ethnically-divided education, but to see if he had 
heard about the 2014 Supreme Court case. Still, similar to my discussion with the primary school 
director, I can see how my inquiry into the matter, both as a Croat and as an outsider, might have 
been unorthodox. At the same time, considering that Bosnian Croats in the Central Bosnia 
Canton may not necessarily recognize the validity of the state-level courts in Sarajevo, since they 
may see Mostar as the “Croat capital in BiH,” it is possible to understand his reaction.  
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A couple of days later, I headed into town to meet a friend for coffee. As I began my 
walk, I was greeted by the next door neighbor who inquired as to where I was headed. We spent 
a few minutes catching up and eventually began to talk about my study. I mentioned to her that I 
was interested in meeting with individuals connected to the local schools, and she said that she 
could introduce me to the director of the combined primary/secondary school in the neighboring 
town because she had met with him before and discussed sending her son to his school, but she 
also had a friend who was a teacher at the school with whom she could visit while I met with the 
director. I did not expect this opportunity to come up, and I gladly accepted her offer. We agreed 
to meet early the next day, a Monday, and drive to the school, once again with the hopes of 
finding the director before he went on vacation. Early the next morning, we drove to the 
neighboring town and made our way to the school. The parking lot was fairly full, which was a 
good sign. 
 
Combined primary/secondary school visit 
During my meeting with this director, we did not speak much about the “two schools 
program,” because this was primarily a Bosniak school, and operated under the Federal 
curriculum, so we spoke more about education in general. My neighbor sat with us while we 
spoke, which was helpful for me because she chimed in here and there and kept the discussion 
moving forward. While I am for the most part fluent in the language, this director spoke rather 
eloquently so it was beneficial to have someone there who was able to keep up with his every 
word, or bring the conversation to a pause. In this particular instance, after our meeting with the 
director my neighbor provided me with additional details about local divisions in education, as 
well as some background information about the director, which further helped me to reflect on 
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the interaction. On another level, this was really my first meeting with a Bosniak person to speak 
about the existing divisions, so her presence was advantageous in the initial approach to the 
discussion. 
After my neighbor introduced us, I shared with the director the nature of my study, and 
then mainly listened to what he had to say. In regards to the divisions in education, the director 
said that the problem is more deeply rooted in the overall political and financial problems in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. A lot of money is spent maintaining the existing divisions, and certain 
steps can be taken to rationalize some of the spending. For example, the director referenced a 
remote village that had a mono-ethnic school with fewer than twenty students, and said that a lot 
of money was spent maintaining this school and employing the necessary individuals, when 
instead, a van or two could be sent to the village to transport the students to a better-equipped 
school closer to town. This was an interesting observation, one that was somewhat echoed by a 
Croat participant later in my study who stated that the current system would not last much longer 
because “there isn’t enough money to pay for two of everything: two directors, two 
administrations, two sets of teachers, [etc.].” It is fair to say that the Croat participant’s remark 
was more or less speculative, but time will tell. Valerie Perry, who worked on education reform 
policy issues at the OSCE Mission to BiH, notes that as of now, there is little incentive for the 
ruling parties to promote compromise, and it is unlikely that these problems will be solved in the 
short-term.179 It is possible to infer that there may be resistance to reforms even among those 
who are employed in the divided system; there are more opportunities for work when there is 
“two of everything.” And while some parents may show preference towards a divided system of 
                                                
179	Perry,	V.	(2014,	October	12).	The	Permanent	Interim:	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina's	Ongoing	Educational	Crisis.	Retrieved	April	
20,	2016,	from	
http://www.academia.edu/8781843/The_Permanent_Interim_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_s_Ongoing_Educational_Crisis.		
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education, based on the overlap of students in better-equipped facilities, or more recently, in 
nursing school programs, the general population appears more concerned with economic 
stability. 
The director said that at his school a large number of students sign up for faith-formation 
classes, as opposed to classes such as information processing, and ones that teach students 
practical skills. He explained that although the faith classes were important, they were theory-
laden, and “a few too many of the week’s hours were spent preparing theologians rather than 
practically-skilled persons such as builders, cooks, and engineers.” He stated that this begs the 
question: “What kind of nation do we want, a theocracy or a secular nation?” Finally, in regards 
to the ethnic divisions in education, the director said the collective taxpayers in the Central 
Bosnia Canton help fund the local system of education. “We are already paying for each other’s 
schooling, so why not be more rational about it?” Though he did not elaborate, the World Bank 
reports that the administrations in each canton identify each school separately in budget 
estimates, and schools are directly funded from canton budgets.180 
It is clear that this director’s stance favors a more centralized approach to education in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but at the same time, when speaking to me, he made distinctions between 
“his” people and “my” people, which was interesting because I did not expect to be “othered.” 
Although, if one takes into account that Croats are numerically a minority population in BiH, it is 
possible to say that from the perspective of the Bosniak majority, Croats are the “other.” Just as 
well, if the events of the war are considered from the perspective of the Bosnian government in 
Sarajevo, it can be said that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was utilized to 
                                                
180	2014	World	Bank	Progress	Report	for	Bosnia-Herzegovina.	Retrieved	March	21,	2016	from	
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/11/06/000333037_20141106220812/Rendered/PDF/
826460WP0P13180Report0Sept020140eng.pdf.		
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suppress separatist forces and stabilize the newly independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
On the other hand, if one takes into account that in this conflict certain parts of Central Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were declared by Croats as part of the quasi-state of Herceg-Bosna, it is 
possible to consider why the return of Bosniaks to these parts, as well as to schools in this area, 
has been met with resistance on the part of local Croat nationalists.  
 
Reflection 
After meeting with these directors, my initial reaction was that education in general 
deserves more attention from Bosnia-Herzegovina’s government. It appeared to me that 
education reforms had become overshadowed by the wider political and financial problems. In 
my interactions with recent Croat graduates of the local secondary schools, many had expressed 
a desire to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina for more opportune areas such as Germany, Austria, and 
even Croatia. In order to do so, some had signed up for nursing school because of the demand for 
medical workers in Western European countries. It should be stated though that Croat desires to 
leave BiH are tied to the fact that Croats in BiH can have dual citizenship in Croatia, and as a 
result of Croatia’s accession to the EU, they are able to travel and work in EU countries. A few 
of these participants mentioned that their nursing programs were frequented by Bosniak students 
who were also seeking to move to Western European countries. Of the several participants who 
had found work in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a couple of them revealed that they were only able to do 
so through “connections,” and one even said it required a bribe. Furthermore, though they had 
found work, they more or less spoke about the precarity of the conditions in BiH. 
Although my time in Central Bosnia was brief, based on these interactions, it appears 
once again that the general population is more concerned with socio-economic conditions, rather 
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than ethno-national autonomy. The individuals with whom I spoke repeatedly expressed that the 
current system benefits only the elites, and that Bosnia-Herzegovina has become an oligarchy. 
Meanwhile, the EU continues to work with the ruling elites, relying on a policy of “carrots and 
sticks.” This has resulted in a largely depoliticized society.181 The fact that returnee numbers 
have tapered off, and that people continue to emigrate from Bosnia-Herzegovina to more 
opportune areas is further indication of this. Because of the consociational nature of democracy, 
and because ethnicity remains the main factor in BiH political identity, the wartime divisions 
linger and are potentially exacerbated in the precarious economic conditions. This has resulted in 
what Azra Hromadžić refers to as “the production of an empty state,” or even more so, what 
Jasmin Mujanovic has dubbed “an institutionalized crisis.”182 Meanwhile, as Bosnia-
Herzegovina hinges on bankruptcy, emergency relief funds are loaned out, and further austerity 
measures are introduced.  
 
Center for Education 
During my time in Central Bosnia, some of my participants referenced a local learning 
center, which offered German and English courses, as well as courses in information processing 
and employment training. Some of my participants had taken German courses at the center in 
their efforts to find work in Germany or Austria. I was interested in the learning center because it 
seemed to operate independently of the local schools, and it seemed like the kind of place that 
was catered to the general population rather than a particular group. I found the center’s website, 
and spent a couple of hours reading through the pages, learning about its history and its 
offerings. Afterwards, I sent an e-mail to the provided contact, in which I mentioned that I was in 
                                                
181	As	one	participant	put	it,	“This	state	was	created	so	that	Europe’s	dirty	money	could	be	laundered.”	
182	Referenced	earlier	in	this	discussion.	
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town for school-related reasons, and was interested in meeting with someone who could tell me 
more about the center. I received a reply from the center’s mail administrator and information 
processing teacher, who informed me of the center’s hours of operations, and that I could stop by 
and meet with the director of the center. I was excited to hear back and replied that I would stop 
by the next day.  
I walked to the learning center the next morning. It wasn’t far from the local bus station, 
where I had been before so I was surprised I hadn’t discovered it in my previous visits to this 
area. The learning center was on the first floor of a two-story building, and as I approached the 
entrance, I could see that it was divided into two rooms. The director was in the larger of the two 
rooms, a computer lab and conference center. The smaller room was used for sewing and 
tailoring courses. I walked in and greeted the director, who was an older gentleman, but an 
energetic speaker. He had been informed that I was going to stop by, and no one else was in the 
room at the time, so we spoke for about forty-five-minutes.  
The director informed me that the school was funded in 2003 by a Swedish organization, 
in cooperation with a locally formed group. The center follows the Swedish model of education, 
and the participants are mixed—there are primary, secondary, and university students, as well as 
working and retired persons. The local center established a second department in a neighboring 
town, which has become quite popular as well. For instance, in 2007, due to the multi-ethnic 
composition of both the instructors as well as the participants, the center received a sliver plaque 
from the municipal government and was rewarded with a budget for the following year. At the 
same time, the director said the center had participants not just from the immediate area, but 
from surrounding towns as well. He informed me that initially, most people were interested in 
computer literacy courses, as well as foreign language courses, but their offerings have grown 
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considerably, and now include employment training classes. The center operated independently 
in 2012, and formed a new partnership in 2013, after their initial partnership concluded. The new 
partnership was also with a Swedish organization, and further enabled the center to increase its 
course offerings.  
One detail the director mentioned was that the center was sponsored by the local Social 
Democratic Party (SDP BiH), but that this was a necessary formality, and their relationship was 
only nominal. After we spoke about the school, the director told me a little about himself, and it 
turned out he was a local man who had played soccer for the town’s club in his younger days. He 
told me that some of the local teachers also helped out at the center, and had played a part in its 
early stages. After our conversation, the director showed me some photographs of the center 
throughout the years, which included trips to Sweden and visits from the Swedish partners, as 
well as graduation ceremonies and anniversaries. I did not expect our conversation to last as long 
as it did, but I was glad to learn about the center’s effective implementation of the Swedish 
model of education. Its longevity also impressed me. 
Before departing, I asked the director if I might be of any use to the learning center, 
perhaps as a volunteer in the English course during my remaining time in Central Bosnia, to 
which he replied that they were well-staffed, but I was welcome to come by and visit. I was 
pleased to have this encounter, and I informed the director that the multi-ethnic composition of 
the center was sort of what I had been trying to find for my study. He commented that the 
center’s enrollment records, from the onset of its operations, reflected the pre-war (mixed) 
enrollment records of local schools, and this was a proud achievement. At the same time, he 
stated that the center has experienced nothing but cooperation between those of different 
backgrounds who enrolled in its course offerings. It is an indication that integration is possible, 
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and that a European model of education is applicable in the Central Bosnia Canton. 
The growth in popularity of information processing and employment training courses, as 
well as German and English, indicates that the general population is anticipating European 
integration. The interest in the center’s offerings, and its overall longevity, perhaps supports the 
notion that the general population is more concerned with economic stability rather than ethno-
national autonomy. Nonetheless, the systemic divisions continue, and whether changes to 
education will be implemented by the ruling parties remains to be seen.  
 
Conclusion 
As of this writing, the “two schools under one roof” program continues to operate in the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there have not been any changes in response to the 2014 
Supreme Court ruling. In the area of my study, a semi-rural mixed town in the Central Bosnia 
Canton, both the primary and secondary school buildings have “two schools under one roof,” 
which have been in place for a little over a decade. The students in these schools attend separate 
shifts, and have separate teachers, directors, and administrations. Although a Federation-wide 
law was passed in 2010, which mandated the administrative reunification of primary and 
secondary schools, the Ministry of Education in the Central Bosnia Canton has not implemented 
changes.  
As my relative in the secondary school mentioned to me, “At the end of every school 
year, for the past five years, there have been whispers about whether there will be administrative 
reunification, but after a few weeks the whispers die down, and nothing changes in the fall. We, 
the workers, don’t really know anything more than that.” Croat leaders have argued in favor of 
autonomy for the protection of national identity and for education in the mother tongue, and they 
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have used the “vital national interest” veto to block reforms from implementation. What may be 
necessary in the Central Bosnia Canton and the areas of the Federation where the “two schools 
under one roof” program operates is a more grassroots approach, or perhaps a series of reforms 
in each canton, which would pave the way for entity-wide legislation. At the same time, more 
support for local forms of cohesion, such as the learning center, can help to improve education 
and overall governance.  
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
 
While Bosnia-Herzegovina’s leaders have made renewed commitments to work towards 
European integration, they have ultimately failed to promote inter-ethnic cooperation, which has 
prevented genuine reconciliation from taking place. Though the ruling parties have repeatedly 
agreed to work together, resistance to the EU state-building project has been strong, especially 
among Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, which has further hindered reform efforts targeted at 
reintegration. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ruling parties have used the power-sharing mechanisms 
established in the Dayton Peace Accords, such as the “vital national interest” veto, to retain the 
present arrangements and resist reforms designed to strengthen the state government. The 
European Union has responded through the OHR and the higher courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
but this direct involvement has been met with further resistance on the part of ethno-national 
elites and used to assert their reelection. 
Although it is clear that solutions to the reform failures in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not as 
simple as creating institutions, it remains to be seen if the EU’s approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
will be modified. Considering the present circumstances in Europe, it is possible to say that this 
may be the last chance for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EU to “get it right.” Reforms in 
education must take place if Bosnia-Herzegovina’s citizens are to undergo genuine 
reconciliation, and if they are expected to compete in the European market.  
At the same time, it is clear that there is not a “one-size-fits-all” solution to the problem 
of ethnically-divided education in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The change in approach by the OSCE 
for instance, from direct involvement in reform efforts to a more a-political strategy, is worth 
noting. Additionally, what may be required in the three cantons where the “two schools under 
one roof” program continues to operate is a more grassroots approach, or perhaps a series of 
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reforms in each canton, which would pave the way for entity-wide and state-level legislation. 
Based on my experience, what seems to be taking place in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an 
ongoing population shift, in which Bosniak numbers have increased or remained steady, while 
Croat numbers have possibly decreased.183  
What was perhaps once understood as Croat territory has become a shared space. 
Although Croats are a constitutive nation in BiH, a population shift may nevertheless have an 
effect on the local power-sharing arrangements. In my understanding of the matter, this ongoing 
shift has been met with resistance on the part of Croat nationalists. As noted in the earlier 
chapters, laws mandating changes in education have not been implemented by Croat Ministers in 
the Central Bosnia Canton. This has enabled the ethnically-divided system of education, and the 
“two schools under one roof” program to continue. 
Though an ethnically-divided system of education may allow for the protection of 
national identity, it is counter-productive to the wider goals of European integration, and to an 
understanding of social identity as a dynamic process. As the work of scholars interested in this 
region shows, genuine reconciliation cannot take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina until there is a 
consensus regarding the events of the past, which cannot be achieved as long as there is a system 
that encourages different interpretations, and which ultimately allows schools to become private 
spaces rather than forums for cohesion.  
Although the citizens of BiH recently voiced a united concern over the political and 
economic stagnancy the country faces, resistance to reform efforts on the part of ethno-national 
leaders at multiple levels of government continues to encourage spatial divisions.  
 
                                                
183	The	results	of	first	post-war	census	are	scheduled	for	publication	in	June	2016.	These	are	speculations	based	on	my	
discussions	with	individuals	in	the	area	over	the	past	twenty	years.		
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As an example, below is a more recent picture of the primary school that I photographed above, 
in June, taken later that year in August. As can be seen, a message of support for a local Croat 
war-time leader has again been placed on the school, while additional markers have been sprayed 
over the original spot. 
 
 
Figure 4. Primary School in Central Bosnia, Croat nationalist graffiti. Source 
 
On a more personal note it is important to recognize that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a land 
that is rich in culture and in history. It is necessary that those who are in power, and those 
working towards reforms ensure that all of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s citizens are able to learn and 
influence its culture, and be part of its history. At the same time, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a land 
that is rich in resources, and it is vital that this land is not exploited, but that it is maintained for 
those who are yet to come. In many ways, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a part of Europe already, but 
now, as the country finds itself somewhat on the formal threshold to European integration, it is 
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perhaps even more vital that its citizens are able to thrive on the land and grow their knowledge 
of it. In order for this to happen, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s leaders must work together, and the 
international community must maintain its focus in the matter. Finally, though we as outsiders 
may assume that Bosnia-Herzegovina has a long way to go, there are elements of life there that 
are worth learning and preserving, as well as elements of life worth improving. 
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